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Abstract
This study examines the statistical significance of systematic and firm-specific determi-
nants of Credit Default Swap (CDS) price variations. We cast doubt on the firm-specific
determinants showed in prior research to be statistical significance to CDS price varia-
tions. In this paper, two research questions are studied: (1) “Which and to what extent
systematic factors can explain the individual CDS price variations?” and (2) “Which and
to what extent the firm-specific factors can predict CDS spread variations that are not ex-
plained by systematic factors?”. We find that systematic factors account for the majority
changes of the CDS spreads (R2 = 35%). Merely 4 of 28 firm-specific factors are statis-
tically significant predictors for CDS changes that are not explained by the systematic
factors and they have little explanatory power (R2 = 8%). We document that individual
CDS variations can be more related to the systematic factors than to firm-specific factors.
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Corporate Credit Default Swap Systematic Factors
Abstract
This study examines the statistical significance of systematic and firm-specific determinants of
Credit Default Swap (CDS) price variations. We cast doubt on the firm-specific determinants
showed in prior research to be statistical significance to CDS price variations. In this paper, two
research questions are studied: (1) “Which and to what extent systematic factors can explain
the individual CDS price variations?” and (2) “Which and to what extent the firm-specific
factors can predict CDS spread variations that are not explained by systematic factors?”. We
find that systematic factors account for the majority changes of the CDS spreads (R2 = 35%).
Merely 4 of 28 firm-specific factors are statistically significant predictors for CDS changes that
are not explained by the systematic factors and they have little explanatory power (R2 = 8%).
We document that individual CDS variations can be more related to the systematic factors
than to firm-specific factors.
Keywords: Credit Default Swap (CDS), CDS Systematic Factors, CDS Firm-specific Factors.
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1 Introduction
Credit default swap (CDS) is a financial product, serving as an insurance to protect contract
buyers against a loss due to firm’s default. Because of its simple product structure1, CDS
becomes the most popular tool for managing individual firm’s default risk among institutional
investors such as banks. The structure of the CDS contract implies that the price, or CDS
spread, should reflect only individual firm’s default probability. Before the Great Financial
Crisis, CDS studies were centered on the modeling of firm’s credit or default risk (see, e.g.,
Duffie and Singleton, 1999; Jarrow et al., 1997; Merton, 1974, among the seminal papers).
Although these models work reasonably well in pricing the CDS spreads, the models fail
to explain the changes of the CDS spreads.2 In the last decade, identifying the determinants
for CDS spreads changes has been a central question in CDS studies, and many studies have
provided insights on the CDS spread changes (e.g. Das and Hanouna (2009) and Pereira et al.
(2018) studied accounting- and market-based information effect on individual CDS changes;
Tang and Yan (2007) and Coró et al. (2013) studied the non-credit effect on CDS spread
changes).
The studies on CDS determinants mostly focused on firm-specific factors, while very few
looked at how systematic information can influence CDS price dynamics. Regardless, there
are growing evidence of the systematic dynamic of the CDS spread (e.g. Anderson, 2017). To
illustrate our argument, Table 1 lists the literature on CDS determinants chronically from 2005
to 20193 from 21 journal articles. Although unlikely exhausting, our list illustrates the firm-
1In a CDS contract, protection seller compensates protection buyer the amount lost due to a credit event
(e.g. default) of a firm. In return, protection buyer pays periodic premium, or CDS spread, to protection seller
during the protection periods until the credit event. CDS spread is the quoted price traded in CDS markets;
higher spread indicates more likeliness of firm’s default; hence CDS spread can measure firm’s default in a given
future period. In the following, the terms CDS spread and CDS price are used interchangeably.
2Houweling and Vorst (2005) compared the model prices and the market prices of the CDS spread and
conclude that the theoretical pricing models were in general working fine. But Lin et al. (2019) document
that the CreditGrade model, a CDS pricing model based on Merton (1974), only captures 9% of the monthly
variation of the CDS spreads.
3Here we briefly explain the inclusion of the list: we base on the literature review in Augustin et al. (2014)
and extend the list of publications that we found up to 2019. Due to the sheer amount of CDS literature
and the result credibility, we include only journal publications of empirical studies on CDS determinants. In
addition, we exclude sovereign CDS studies. We also exclude studies in CDS indexes or portfolios for the same
reason; however, we also note here that CDS studies on systematic factors sometimes use CDS index or CDS
portfolio to investigate the systematic factors. The discussion in this strand is provided in latter section. For
the short-listed studies on individual CDS, we first read the article abstract and decide subjectively whether
or not this article fits in our inclusion criteria. If the article of interest is related to CDS determinants, then
we further read the article’s empirical results and categorize the article into one of three groups–Systematic,
Firm-specific or Both, depending on what factors the article used in the empirical results. Our search begins
with 2005 because we find that the CDS literature focused on the CDS pricing model, no publication studies
empirical test on determinants.
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specific determinants being dominated in CDS literature. Although 12 articles (or just under
60% of our list) included systematic factors as a subset of their variables, many of these studies
did not study these factors carefully and they were only included as control variables in the
regressions.4 Hence, the importance of CDS systematic factors has seemingly been overlooked
in the CDS literature.
[Table 1 is around here.]
In this study, we highlight the importance of the systematic factors to the individual CDS
spread. Since each firm has different risk exposure to systematic factors, traditional analysis on
CDS spread (which usually put all systematic and firm-specific variables together in one regres-
sion) potentially underestimates the impact from systematic side, as such method overlooks the
cross-sectional effect imposed by the systematic factors. Different from prior studies, we allow
the systematic effect to be different at firm level. Thus, we study firm-specific determinants’
impact that cannot be explained by the systematic factors (i.e. idiosyncratic changes of the
CDS spreads). Using idiosyncratic values of a variable when studying firm-specific effect is not
new to many financial studies (e.g. stock), but this is not yet seen in CDS studies. Hence,
we analyze the systematic and firm-specific impact separately. The separation of CDS spread
changes into systematic and firm-specific impacts is motivated by Green et al. (2017), in which
the authors find that only a few firm characteristics can explain the monthly stock return, after
controlling for well-known stock systematic factors. Inspired by their study, we cast doubt
on the importance of the firm-specific determinants showed in prior research to be statistical
significance to CDS price variations.
Two research questions are studied in this paper: (1) “Which and to what extent systematic
factors can explain the individual CDS spread variations?” and (2) “Which and to what extent
the firm-specific factors can predict CDS spread variations that are not explained by systematic
factors?” For the first question, we start by identifying a list of exogenous and endogenous CDS
systematic factors that were mentioned or showed to influence individual CDS spreads. We then
run individual time-series regressions of CDS spreads on the list of systematic factors for each
CDS underlying firms to determine the systematic factors that are statistically significant.
For the second question, we regress the unexplained part taken from the first-step regressions
on a set of CDS firm-specific factors identified in literature; we then investigate whether these
firm-specific variables are still significant predictors or determinants of CDS price. While prior
4While all the articles used firm-specific or mixed CDS determinants, we further note with an asterisk if the
study uses systematic variables only as control variables.
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studies put all the variables of interest together in one regression, the novelty of our two-step
procedure can provide an insight on the importance of systematic and firm-specific factors
separately. We argue that many of the CDS firm-specific factors, identified by prior studies,
may just covariate with the systematic information; therefore, the “idiosyncratic component”
of these factors actually carries very little information about CDS price variations and are not
as important as previously documented. To our best knowledge, we are the first CDS study on
identifying the separate effects of systematic and firm-specific variables.
We investigate the 5-year CDS spreads of U.S. non-financial firms over the sample period
of January 2001 to June 2018 and document the impact of systematic factors on the CDS
spreads. Eight systematic factors we proposed in this study – default spread (defined as the
difference between Moody’s BAA and AAA), term spread (defined as the difference between
10-year and 3-month U.S. Treasury yields), VIX, S&P500 index, 5-year U.S. Treasury yield, and
three CDS spread averages (overall, rating, and sector) – account for, on average, 35% of the
monthly CDS spread variations of 259 firms. Furthermore, we find evidence that endogenous
systematic factors are stronger in explaining contemporaneous CDS variations while exogenous
systematic factors are stronger in explaining predictive CDS variations. These results are also
robust in our sub-sample analyses. The results for systematic factors provide several new
insights on understanding the monthly changes of the individual CDS spreads. First of all, we
highlight the systematic risk embedded in the CDS spreads, consistent with prior literature on
the common pricing factors in CDS spreads (e.g., Anderson, 2017; Blanco et al., 2005, among
others). Further to these studies, in which usually CDS index or portfolios are used, we show
that the systematic factors also have pronounced explanatory power at entity level.
We show the exogenous source of the systematic risks. Our factors are constructed from
stock, bond, and credit markets, and the significance of the co-movement to these financial
markets implies that the pricing of the individual CDSs is also affected by the market conditions.
The strong co-movement between CDS and other financial markets is also documented in
prior studies (Forte and Pena, 2009; Norden and Weber, 2009). But the co-movement was
studied at aggregated levels (e.g. CDS index or portfolios). In this study, we further show
that exogenous systematic factors also matter at entity level. Also importantly, the systematic
risk of their peers is documented, in addition to the exogenous risks. CDS systematic risk was
previously focused mainly on exogenous factors; our findings suggest that peer information is
more important than exogenous systematic factors in terms of contemporaneous CDS spread
changes. We also show that three levels of peer information (i.e. overall, rating, and sector
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levels) all contribute to the CDS price variations, while the prior studies only cover parts of
the peer information, e.g. Galil et al. (2014) (sector, overall) and Lin et al. (2019) (overall).
Although some studies (e.g. Doshi et al., 2013; Hammoudeh et al., 2013; Norden and Weber,
2009) showed certain systematic factors for CDS spreads that are endogenously embedded in
the stock and bond markets of the underlying firms, we find that, at the time of writing, no
previous study provides a comprehensive analyses on CDS systematic factors at entity level.
In this study, we fill the gap in this strand of literature by providing a thorough investigation
on the importance of systematic determinants of CDS spreads.
On the contrary, we find that firm-specific variables are rather weak in explaining monthly
CDS variations that are not explained by the systematic factors. Twenty-eight (28) firm-specific
variables altogether can merely account for 8% of the unexplained CDS (predictive) variations.
Only 4 of the 28 firm-specific variables are statistically significant for CDS predictive variations.
It indicates that firm-specific CDS determinants are not as important as prior studies argued.
Also, the insignificance of most firm-specific variables implies that the variations of theses
variables coincide with the variations of the systematic information. Specifically, the four
variables that can provide independent information, contemporaneously and one month ahead,
for the monthly changes in CDS are the number of CDS contributors (CDSContr), firm’s debt-
to-equity ratio (DERatio), net income (NITMA) and underlying stock price (StoPrice). These
four variables are related to firm’s accounting and market information as well as CDS illiquidity.
It means that the idiosyncratic changes of the the CDS spread are affected by various aspects
of the firm-specific information. However, our results suggest that many firm-specific variables
covariate each other; hence using multivariate regression helps to identify which variable can
outperforms the others in terms of statistical significance.
Additional 5 firm-specific variables – cash holding (CASHMTA), CashRatio, CDS high-
minus-low (CDSHL), CDSSlope, and stock Amihud (StoAmihud) – are shown to explain the
contemporaneous changes of the CDS srpeads, most of which are related to illiquidity. This
highlights the illiquidity impact on individual CDS spread changes (Coró et al., 2013; Das and
Hanouna, 2009; Lin et al., 2019). Albeit, overall merely one-third of the firm-specific variables
included in this study show statistical significance in explaining CDS spread movement, which,
as we argue, casts doubt on the importance of the firm-specific variables.
Our findings in systematic and firm-specific factors provide important implications. As
individual CDS price variations are well explained by systematic factors, it implies that the
variations are affected by information from different financial markets, and CDS market is
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therefore vulnerable to the overall financial market condition; we also find evidence from our
sub-period analyses that this vulnerability is more pronounced when other financial markets
are in turbulence. Our findings provide support for the importance of systematic factors in
CDS market, which was largely overlooked by prior studies. In practice, our findings provide a
foundation for a number of useful applications of CDS systematic factors. For example, a better
estimation of CDS implied default probability for firms with untraded or highly illiquid CDS
contracts, which can be used for, but not limited to, the calculation of risk capital attributed
to counterparty credit risk according to Basel Accord.
Finally, we briefly discuss the development in several strands of CDS literature that are
linked to our paper. After the seminal study of Merton (1974), several studies examine if
the CDS prices are indeed explained by the determinants described in the structure model.
Blanco et al. (2005) study the theoretical equilibrium between CDS spread and credit spread,
and they find that the equilibrium largely holds. But they also document two types of the
deviation between the actual CDS spread and the theoretical CDS spread derived from credit
spread: the long-term deviation stems from the model imperfection and the measurement
error, while the short-term deviation is caused when CDS reacts before credit spread in the
face of credit events. Similarly, Ericsson et al. (2009) use linear regression to examine if the
theoretical CDS determinants can explain the actual prices, and they find statistical significance
in the determinant’s coefficients; Pires et al. (2015) further use quantile regression to document
that the statistical significance increases for high-risk firms. In addition, Bai and Wu (2016)
propose to use Merton (1974) distance to default with a long list of firm-specific characteristics
to estimate individual firm’s CDS spreads; Campbell et al. (2008) propose several firm-specific
accounting- and market-based factors to predict firm’s default risk.
Some studies explore the CDS determinants in addition to the model-implied credit factors.
Among these, one main strand is to understand the CDS illiquidity in relation to the CDS
spread. Bongaerts et al. (2011) develop a theoretical asset pricing model incorporating deriva-
tive illiquidity, and they empirically document that CDS sellers earn the illiquidity premium,
although the impact from illiquidity is economically small. On the other hand, some studies
find the CDS illiquidity rather important. Coró et al. (2013) find that the bid-ask spreads of
intra-day CDS trades dominate other credit risk factors in explaining the CDS spreads for 135
European entities. Tang and Yan (2007) examine trade-to-quote ratio and bid-ask spread of
CDS trades, and report a positive effect of these illiquidity measures on CDS spreads; simi-
lar findings documented in financial CDSs (Annaert et al., 2013). Mayordomo et al. (2014)
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examine the CDS illiquidity and they document that the individual CDS illiquidity is related
to the market-wide illiquidity. In addition, Cao et al. (2010) and Das and Hanouna (2009)
find that equity illiquidity and volatility are also priced in CDS spreads, implying the price
connection between financial markets. In addition to CDS illiquidity as CDS spread determi-
nants, some studies also document other factors, e.g. earning surprise (Callen et al., 2009),
counterparty credit risk (Arora et al., 2012), CDS demand-supply imbalance (Tang and Yan,
2017), and bank-specific information (Chiaramonte and Casu, 2013; Coudert and Gex, 2013),
to be influential on individual firm’s CDS spreads. Das et al. (2009) study the accounting- and
market-based firm-specific factors, and they argue that both types of CDS determinants are
equally important in the pricing of CDS spreads.
Since a number of CDS determinants are constructed from equity or bond markets, and
default risk structural model indicates that CDS market is linked to these financial markets,
many studies focus on the co-movement among stock, bond, and CDS markets. Fung et al.
(2008), Hilscher et al. (2015), and Lee et al. (2018) study the interaction between CDS and stock
markets, but their findings are different. Fung et al. (2008) find a mutual effect between the two
markets. Though, Hilscher et al. (2015) find that stock market more often leads CDS market,
indicating that informed traders are more active in equity market. However, the authors find
that, during salient events, CDS market is more likely to lead stock market. But Lee et al.
(2018) find that CDS market predicts stock market. Similarly, Norden and Weber (2009) find
that stock market more often leads bond and CDS markets, but CDS provides more information
for price discovery; in addition, Alexander and Kaeck (2008) further show that the connection
between these financial markets are time-varying. Hammoudeh et al. (2013) find that CDSs in
financial sector affect CDSs in other sectors during the financial crisis, making the CDS market
less stable.
Studies on CDS systematic factors are a small but growing strand in the literature. Alexan-
der and Kaeck (2008) find that iTraxx index can be explained, time-varyingly, by the market-
wide factors such as interest rate, stock return, and volatility. Amato (2005) studies the default
risk premium, measured by the CDX index subtracted by expected loss, and document that
macroeconomic factors, e.g. inflation, monetary policy, and global CDO (collateralized debt
obligation) issuance, affect the premium, indicating that investor’s risk aversion is priced in the
default risk premium. Anderson (2017) find that CDS co-movement was increasing during the
2007–2009 financial crisis, possibly due that fundamental values became more correlated. Doshi
et al. (2013) propose to use a reduced-form model incorporating macro covariates to estimate
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firm’s CDS spread. Last but not at least, Galil et al. (2014) find that the sector median CDS
spread can explain the individual CDS spread movements. Notably, most of the studies on
CDS systematic factors use CDS index, e.g. CDX (Amato, 2005) and iTraxx (Alexander and
Kaeck, 2008), or CDS portfolio, e.g. EDF (Expected Default Frequency)-sorted CDS portfolios
in (Alexander and Kaeck, 2008).
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2 Research Design
To answer our two main research questions, a two-step regression procedure is used in this
study. Firstly, we run a regression of CDS spreads on systematic factors for each underlying
firms to test how well the systematic factors can explain individual CDS spreads, and then we
regress the residuals of the previous regressions on a comprehensive set of firm-specific variables.
2.1 Systematic Variables
Our first hypothesis is that there is a high explanatory power because of high co-movement of
CDS market with other financial markets. Also, since CDS is also used to hedge other financial
securities (e.g. its application to hedge stock for downside risk), hypothetically systematic risk
is high in individual CDS contracts. Therefore, we formulate our first hypothesis as follows:
H1: The systematic factors have high explanatory power on the variations of the CDS spread.
To test hypothesis H1, we run a time-series regression for each underlying firm i :
∆ log(C it) = β
i
0 + β
i
1 ∆X
s
t + ε
i
t (1)
where C it is CDS spread for firm i and X
s
t is a set of systematic factors and ∆ represents
the monthly changes of Xst. As there are 259 individual regressions, we report the average of
coefficient significance and that of goodness of fit measures across the regressions to understand
the significance of our systematic factors. We use Newey-West t-statistics (12-month lags) to
test the coefficient significance. As a robustness check, we also run the panel version of Equation
(1).
Eight systematic factors are chosen from a number of CDS studies in which these systematic
factors were found to link to CDS market. The systematic factors are then separated into two
groups: there are five exogenous systematic factors which represent the influence to individual
CDS from other financial markets, and three endogenous systematic factors which represents
the influence from within the CDS market. The exogenous factors are as follows:
i Default Spread (DftSpr) is defined as the difference between Moody’s AAA and BAA
yields. Default spread represents the overall default risk in the view point of market
participants. This factor appears in Doshi et al. (2013) and Galil et al. (2014).
ii Term Spread (TermSpr) is defined as the difference between the 10-year and 3-month
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Treasury yields. Term spread represents investor’s preference of liquidity. Since CDS is a
hedging tool, funding liquidity is expected to affect the implementation of hedging. This
factor is proposed in Conrad et al. (2011), Galil et al. (2014), and Longstaff et al. (2011).
iii VIX index gauges investor’s fear of stock market uncertainty. Since stock market and
CDS market are linked, stock market’s uncertainty may spill over to CDS market. This
factor is used as CDS determinants in Diaz et al. (2013), Doshi et al. (2013), and Galil
et al. (2014).
vi We choose S&P500 index to test the link between equity and CDS markets, and U.S.
Treasury yield in 5-year tenor to test the link between bond and CDS markets. Studies
(e.g. Norden and Weber, 2004, 2009) show that there exists mutually causal linkage
between equity, bond, and CDS markets.
The endogenous CDS systematic factors are captured by different averages of CDS spreads.
The averaging approach can keep peer information but remove firm-specific information. Three
cross-sectional averages are considered as endogenous systematic factors in this study:
i Total average of CDS spreads (AvgSpr) is used in Galil et al. (2014) and Lin et al. (2019).
ii Rating-averaged CDS spreads (AvgSpr R) is also included as Kolokolova et al. (2019)
found that individual CDS spread has tendency to move to their rating-based estimates.
Therefore, a firm’s rating information provides systematic information.
iii Sector-averaged CDS spreads (AvgSpr S) is proposed in Galil et al. (2014).
Notably, when running multivariate regression, there is overlap betweenAvgSpr andAvgSpr R
(or AvgSpr S). Therefore, we adjust the AvgSpr variable by AvgSpr∗ = AvgSpr−AvgSpr R−
AvgSpr S + AvgSpr RS, where AvgSpr RS is the averaged CDS spread by sector and rat-
ing. Endogenous (exogenous) factors represent the linkage to peer (other financial markets).
Here, we conjecture that individual CDSs have higher co-movement with their peer, and that
the magnitude of co-movement is more significant when financial market(s) is under higher
uncertainty. Therefore, we expand our H1 hypothesis to two relevant hypotheses as follows:
H2: The endogenous systematic factors are stronger than exogenous systematic factors, and
H3: Systematic factors are more pronounced when market is in turmoil.
We test hypothesis H2 by running univariate regressions to compare the significance of
the exogenous and endogenous factors, and test hypothesis H3 by using running sub-period
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regressions as described in Equation (1).
2.2 Firm-specific Variables
The hypothesis on our second research question regarding firm-specific variables is formulated
as follows:
H4: Only some of the firm-specific factors can explain and predict the variations of CDS
spread that are not explained by systematic factors.
Although we do not take any pre-conjecture in this regard, we hypothesize that not all
of the factors are significant, because some of the firm-specific variables may reflect merely
market information which is already captured in the controlled systematic variables. From
this hypothesis, we can understand which firm-specific variables can truly provide firm-specific
information in explaining and predicting CDS spread variations.
To test the hypothesis H4, we run a panel regression as follows:
∆Idioit+1 = γ0 + γ1 ∆X
f
it + ζit, (2)
where ∆Idioit is the part that cannot captured by systematic factors and is calculated by β
i
0+ε
i
t
in Equation (1). Xf is the chosen set of firm-specific factors in this study. When we test the
significance for the coefficients, we follow Hoechle (2007) to use heteroscasdaticity-robust and
autocorrelation-robust (with 12-month lags) standard error.
There is a long list of literature on CDS determinants. We use Augustin et al. (2014) as
a starting point of our search for firm-specific determinants of CDS spreads, and continue to
search for other firm-specific variables used in more-recently published journal articles. After
considering for data availability and other factors, we include 33 firm-specific CDS determinants
in this study. Table 2 provides the detailed definition for all the firm-specific variables used in the
study with the relevant literature5. We find that four studies, i.e. Anderson (2017), Bai and Wu
(2016), Campbell et al. (2008), and Das and Hanouna (2009), include most of CDS determinants
that we choose in this study. We group the 33 variables into five categories: Accounting and
Market Mixed, Balance Sheet, Financial Market, Income Statement, and Liquidity.
[Table 2 is around here.]
5As different studies may have a slightly different definitions for the variables, our matching for the variables
with literature is not perfect; for some variables we match the literature that has a very similar variable to the
one being included in our list.
11
3 Data
Data used in this study is collected from multiple sources. CDS data is obtained from Markit.
We use the most liquid 5-year CDS contracts. The CDS underlying equity data is obtained
from Compustat/CRSP merged database. Option-related information is obtained from Option-
Metrics. Underlying bond data is obtained from TRACE. All data is downloaded via WRDS.
We use a commercial proprietary list, in which tickers and other identifiers of CDS underlying
information are recorded, for the merging of data from different databases.
The data of 259 U.S. non-financial firms over the sample period from January 2001 to June
2018 is matched for the analysis in this study. The summary statistics of all the variables we
include in the study is reported in Table 3.
[Table 3 is around here.]
Before performing the regression, we have addressed two issues which can affect the accuracy
of the regression results: missing values and multicollinearity. In the following, we detail the
procedures of addressing these two issues.
3.1 Resolving Missing Values
As we gather firm-specific variables from multiple sources, the data availability of some variables
is more extensive than that of the others in the sample period; therefore, it is inevitable to have
missing values when we combine multiple datasets. However, if we drop all observations with
missing values, there are two major concerns affecting the robustness of the results: First, we
do not have sufficient observations for the analysis, and second, omitting observations with
missing values from the sample may potentially result in biased statistical inference, known as
missing not at random (Casella and Berger, 2002). Hence, we avoid dropping observations with
missing values from our sample.
To use all the observations available, we follow closely the steps of handling missing observa-
tions described in Green et al. (2017). The technique used by Green et al. is called zero-order
regression proposed by Wilks (1932). Technically, we first winsorize the firm-specific variables
at 1% and 99% levels; then standardize them by subtracting its sample mean and divide the
difference by its sample standard deviation. The winsorization and standardization are per-
formed for each firm. After that, we replace all the missing values by zero. With this approach,
we are able to keep all the viable observations while avoiding biased statistical estimates (Afifi
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and Elashoff, 1966).
3.2 Multicollinearity Analysis
The other concern is the existence of multicollinearity from the large number of independent
variables. Among the initial list of 33 firm-specific variables, some variables may capture
similar information to some extent, resulting in highly correlated independent variables in the
regressions.
Multicollinearity in a multivariate regression results in coefficients having wrong signs, huge
magnitudes, and very high standard errors (therefore low significance levels) (Greene, 2011).
Hence, we perform a Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) analysis to detect the existence of multi-
collinearity.
Methodologically, we calculate VIFs for all the variables and drop the one variable that has
the highest VIF each time. We repeat the procedure until the VIFs for all firm-specific variables
are less than 7. Although there is no specific threshold value for VIF, V IF ≤ 7 is the most
commonly used rule of thumb in empirical studies.
Table 4 reports the VIFs of the variables before and after dropping. Initially, the set of 33
firm-specific variables has an average VIF of 5.56, with the maximum value of 29.16 (TLMTA)
and the minimum value of 1.01 (CBPrice and CDSContr). After dropping five firm-specific
variables, i.e. CARatio, LLB, MktCap, QuickRatio, and TLMTA, the average VIF is 2.51, with
the maximum value of 6.99 (ROA) and the minimum value of 1.01 (CBPrice and CDSContr).
We update our set of variables and include the remaining 28 firm-specific variables in our
analysis to tackle the problem of multicollinearity.
[Table 4 is around here.]
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4 Results
4.1 Systematic Factor Results
Table 5 reports the individual time-series regressions of the firm’s CDS spreads on the systematic
factors. We report the average coefficients of the 259 regressions and the percentages of the
significance of at least 5% level. The left-hand panel reports multivariate regression results and
the right-hand panel reports univariate regression results according to Equation (1).
In the univariate result (right panel), except for term spread, all other systematic factors
are statistically significant in explaining the change in the CDS spreads, in most (59.46% to
81.85%) of the 259 regressions. This indicates that the systematic factors effectively capture
the information regarding the changes in individual CDS spreads. From the Adj.R2 of the
univariate regressions, we find that in general endogenous systematic factors (i.e. AvgSpr,
AvgSpr R, and AvgSpr S) have higher explanatory power than exogenous systematic factors.
[Table 5 is around here.]
The signs of the averaged coefficients is as expected in the univariate result.6 The exogenous
systematic factors, default spread and VIX, are positively related to the changes of the CDS
spreads, while equity and Treasury bond market performance are negatively related to the
changes of CDS spreads. For the three endogenous systematic factors, they are all positively
related to the change of CDS spreads, indicating strong co-movement among the CDS contracts.
In the multivariate result (left panel), the signs of the averaged coefficients remain the same
except for term spread and VIX. Interestingly, we observe higher percentages of significance for
endogenous factors than those for exogenous factors, implying that peer information is more
important than exogenous information in explaining contemporaneous changes in the CDS
spreads. Also, the Adj. R2 in the multivariate systematic factor model is 35%, which is much
higher than the ones in the univariate regressions; this indicates the systematic factors capture
different aspects of market information and are not substitutes to each other.
Finally, we would like to highlight the low percentage of significance in constant term. Since
the constant term partly represents the unexplained changes of the CDS spreads from the
systematic factors, the weak significance implies that the systematic factors can sufficiently
explain the CDS spread changes and therefore other factors, especially firm-specific factors,
6The averaged coefficients we report here include all 259 regressions. Some may argue to exclude insignificant
coefficients in the average; we find such exclusion does not alter our conclusions.
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may not be significant in explaining the spread changes. We will discuss further evidence in
the next section.
We then test the predictability of the systematic factors. Table 6 reports the regression
results with systematic factors lagged by one month. In general, we find lower percentages of
significance and weaker Adj. R2, indicating the systematic factors mostly capture the contem-
porary information and are weak in predictability. However, we find that default spread has
the strongest predictive power among the factors. The percentage of the significance is 33.20%
and 49.81% in multivariate and univariate regressions respectively.
[Table 6 is around here.]
As robustness check, we perform a panel regression on all the systematic factors, controlling
for firm fixed effect. The signs and individual significance are consistent with our previous
results, except that term spread, VIX, and S&500 index, which are insignificant in the panel
regression.
[Table 7 is around here.]
The sub-sample analysis for different sectors and ratings is provided in Table 8. We find
that, in general, the percentages of the significance and the Adj. R2 do not vary much among
industry sectors and ratings. In the sub-period analyses, we find the Adj. R2 is highest during
the financial crisis period (Column InCrisis, Table 8). This indicates that systematic factors are
most pronounced in explaining CDS spread changes when the financial market is in turmoil.
[Table 8 is around here.]
4.2 Firm-specific Variable Results
Table 9 reports the results for firm-specific factors. The right-hand panel provides the results for
univariate regressions and the left-hand panel provides the results for multivariate regression.
The dependent variable is the unexplained variation of the CDS spreads from our proposed
systematic factors, ∆Idioit. Although half of the 28 firm-specific variables show statistical
significance for predicting the monthly change of the CDS spreads one month later at 5% level
in univariate regression, we find that only 4 variables can still exhibit statistical predictability in
the multivariate setting. Such difference between univariate and multivariate results highlights
the fact that most of the firm-specific variables are correlated with each other, and hence
they share similar or overlapped information about the corporate credit risk. Therefore, most
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of them do not actually provide “independent” information in the prediction of CDS spread
changes. It also implies that firm-specific factors may not be as important in predicting CDS
spread changes as suggested in the prior studies, given that the low prediction performance is
observed in a versatile set of the firm-specific variables.
[Table 9 is around here.]
Since there can be potential omitted variable bias when interpreting the results in univari-
ate regressions, we move on to the multivariate regression results of the statistically significant
variables, to explore which variables are truly the important determinants for the CDS spread
variation that are not explained by systematic factors. At the first glance, the four variables
– CDSContr, DERatio, NIMTA, and StoPrice – are related to firm’s accounting and market
information as well as CDS liquidity. DERatio and NIMTA are constructed mainly by account-
ing items, StoPrice is the market traded price and CDSContr reflects the trading activity in
CDS market; it means that the idiosyncratic changes of the CDS spread is indeed affected by
various aspects of firm-specific factors.
Three firm’s fundamental variables are able to predict the monthly changes of the CDS
spreads. DERatio represents firm’s insolvency risk, with higher debt-to-equity ratio, the firm
is more likely to default. Hence the change in the debt-to-equity ratio predicts the increases
of the CDS spreads. As said, although there are other variables included in the multivariate
regression e.g. interest coverage (IntCover) and accounting liabilities (Liab) to gauge firm’s
insolvency risk, theses variables also covariate DERatio and it turns out that DERatio only
statistically explains the innovation of the CDS spread. We also document firm’s profitability
(NIMTA) can predict the monthly change of the CDS spread one month later. Higher profit
indicates lower probability of default; hence the increase in profit predicts the decrease in CDS
spread. Similarly, NIMTA stands out of other similar variables, such as ROA and net income
growth, in predicting the monthly changes. Finally, we find that stock price strongly predicts
the CDS spread movement. Higher stock price indicates better future performance; the negative
coefficient meets our expectation of a negative relation between stock price and CDS spread.
Importantly, many Merton-based structural models use underlying stock price to determine the
corporate default risk, our result supports the importance of using stock price to capture the
CDS price innovation.
In addition to firm’s fundamental, CDS liquidity also predicts the future change in CDS
spreads. we document that the number of CDS contributors is negatively related to the CDS
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spread, indicating that when there are more participants in the CDS market, the CDS prices
are likely to decrease in the next month. On the other hand, we do not find other CDS liquidity
measures i.e. CDS Amihud, CDS high-minus-low, and CDS slope, have predictability for the
CDS spread movement. Prior studies find a positive contemporaneous impact of CDS illiquidity
on the CDS spread7; it implies that a decrease in number of CDS contributors in the next period
if we observe an increase in CDS trading activity, since CDS market is illiquid compared with
other financial market. Hence it pushes down the CDS price due to lower number of quotes.
The relatively low R-squares in both the multivariate and univaraite regressions further
support that firm-specific variables provide very limited predictability to CDS spread changes.
To conclude, our results suggest that few firm-specific variables can predict CDS spread changes
after we control for systematic factors, implying the firm-specific variables may be less important
than previously suggested.
After exploring the predictability of firm-specific variables, we also look at the contemporary
influence of firm-specific variables to CDS spread variations. We modify Equation (2) by putting
contemporary firm-specific independent variables. The results are provided in Table 10. We
find that these four firm-specific variables that provide independent predictability are also
correlated to the contemporaneous changes of the CDS spreads, statistically significant at 5%
level. In addition, the signs, except CDSContr, are the same as these in lagged analyses, which
is expected.
[Table 10 is around here.]
We also document some more variables that are also correlated to the contemporaneous
changes of the CDS spreads. CashRatio show that corporate insolvency is important deter-
mining corporate default risk. Interestingly, we observe positive coefficient on CASHMTA,
indicating a positive correlation between cash holding and CDS spread. This phenomenon is
explained by firm’s precautious motive to reserve more cash when facing the coming credit risk.
Similar empirical finding has been documented in Acharya et al. (2012), where the authors find
positive correlation between credit spread (implied by corporate bonds with various ratings)
and firm’s cash holding. Here, we show that the motive of precautious saving is still important
in the case of idiosyncratic changes of CDS spread.
7Our negative coefficient does not conflict with prior studies. Later in our contemporaneous analysis (shown
in Table 10, we indeed document statistically significant and positive coefficients for the CDS liquidity variables.
The results is consistent with prior studies. Instead, our lagged regression depict the overall impact of the CDS
illiquidity on CDS spread.
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Our findings in the importance of liquidity related variables supports prior literature in
which many recent studies such as Tang and Yan (2007) and Coró et al. (2013) argue that
individual firm’s CDS spread is affected by CDS liquidity. Moreover, we show that several
CDS liquidity measures are related to the monthly changes of the individual CDS spreads
that are not explained by the systematic factors, suggesting the importance of CDS illiquidity.
CDS high-minus-low, an alternative measure for CDS bid-ask spread, can explain CDS spread
variations. We also document CDS term structure’s impact on CDS idiosyncratic risk. CDS
slope, defined as the difference between 5- and 1-year CDS spreads, captures the term structure
of the CDS contracts in different times to maturity, and it shows that the preference to a longer
maturity increases the CDS spreads. CDSContr is the number of CDS quote contributors; as
we do not have exact number of the CDS quotes, we use the number of contributors to proxy
this information. However, since not all the quotes eventually become actual trades, we treat
this variable as a measure of search intensity (Tang and Yan, 2007). More intensive searching
indicates the higher demand of CDS protection, pushing up the price of CDS contracts. Hence,
we observe positive association between CDS contributors and CDS spread.
Furthermore, we document a positive association between stock illiquidity and CDS spread.
Since CDS is often used as hedge tools for stock, it indicates that stock illiquidity, similar to
CDS illiquidity, pose an impact on the CDS spread Das and Hanouna (2009).
It is worth noting that many significant firm-spefici variables in Table 9 and 10 are related
to liquidity. It implies that the CDS price changes may mostly reflect the changes in trading
activities.
Finally, we perform sub-sample analyses. Table 11 reports the multivariate regression re-
sults by sectors, ratings, and sub-periods. In general, we observe inconsistency of the variable
significance. The first row counts the number of statistically significant firm-specific variables
at 5% significance threshold. The numbers range from 0 to 6. It implies that the firm-specific
variables fail to provide equivocal predictability. In sector analysis, we find 6 firm-specific
variables can predict CDS spreads one month later for firms in technology sector, while none
of the firm-specitific variables can provide predictability in materials and healthcare sectors.
We find CDS liquidity to have comparably consistent significance in CDS spread prediction.
CDSContr is statistically significant at 5% level in 3 sectors (consumer goods, industrials, and
telecommunication). The statistical significance from CDS liquidity variables indicates that
the monthly changes in CDS spread may mostly reflect the CDS market trading activities,
instead of reflecting the information on credit risk. However, we do not find single firm-specific
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variables to be consistently statistically statistical in all the sectors.
[Table 11 is around here.]
When we study the firm-specific predictability across ratings, we find the predictability
is slightly related to credit quality. The worse rating CDS spreads are barely predicted by
firm-specific information, while firm’s fundamental information performs better in firms with
better credit rating. Similarly, we find CDS liquidity variables demonstrate relatively better
predictability. Three CDS liquidity variables – CDSHL, CDSSlope, and CDSContr – can predict
the CDS spread changes in the sample of A Rating firms. Finally, in sub-period analyses, firm-
specific variables have better predictability in in-crisis period, but after Great Financial Crisis,
the monthly CDS spread changes are mainly driven by systematic factors, only 2 firm-specific
variables are able to predict the CDS spread. It implies that, most of the time, systematic
factors dominate the changes of the CDS spreads.
For the R2 in sub-sample regressions, we find that, during the crisis period, firm-specific
variables have higher R2, indicating stronger predictive power. Across the ratings, CDS con-
tracts with higher rated underlying assets have lower R2, indicating these CDS contracts have
stronger co-movement with other CDS contracts. We also find that the R2 for Energy is the
highest.
In appendix, we repeat our analyses with the variables in level (instead of change), and the
results are qualitatively the same.
4.3 Systematic Factor Multicollinearity Test
So far, we have presented the main results for the systematic and firm-specific CDS determi-
nants; here we conduct additional tests for our systematic factors. The first test is to test
the multicollinearity of the systematic factors. Similar to the VIF analysis for the firm-specific
variables, we repeat the procedure to detect whether there is multicollinearity in the systematic
factors. Although we do not expect multicollinearity appeared in exogenous factors, there is a
potentiality of multicollinearity appeared in the endogenous factors. The VIF results for the
systematic factors are reported in Table 12 and it shows that all the factors are free of mul-
ticollinearity with VIFs between 1.15 and 2.67, well below our threshold of 7. Therefore, we
demonstrate that all the systematic factors capture different aspects of the information. Note
that ∆AvgSpr used in the VIF analysis is the adjusted version, where we remove the overlap
of the sector and rating averages.
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[Table 12 is around here.]
4.4 Systematic Factor Quarterly Analysis
In our main analysis, we study the systematic factor’s impact based on monthly frequency. Here
we investigate whether the effect of the systematic factors is affected when the time horizon is
larger. We run a panel regression with firm-fixed effect for the quarterly changes of the CDS
spreads. We also study the contemporaneous effect and the lagged effect by one quarter of the
systematic factors.
Reported in Table 13, we show that both endogenous and exogenous systematic factors still
significantly explain the quarterly changes of individual CDS spreads. In addition, we find the
goodness-of-fit are stronger in quarterly changes than in monthly changes, implying that the
systematic information is still pronounced in longer term.
[Table 13 is around here.]
4.5 Systematic Effect Conditional on Firm-specific Variables
In our main analysis, we have shown the importance of systematic factors by directly regress
the CDS spread on the systematic factors. One may argue that our two-step method potentially
over-emphasizes the importance of the systematic factors while undermining the firm-specific
variables. We address this concern by reversing our two-step procedure, i.e. we first regress
the CDS spreads on the firm-specific variables, and then regress the unexplained part from the
first step on the systematic factors.
The results are reported in Table 14. Although the goodness-of-fit is low at 7% because
the unexplained part is much noisy, the systematic factors are still statistically important. 6
out of 8 systematic factors are statistically significant at 5% level; only DftSpr and VIX are
insignificant. Hence, we show that the systematic factors are still statistically significant even
after using the CDS spread residuals of the firm-specific variables.
[Table 14 is around here.]
4.6 Non-zero Observations
So far we find that firm-specific variables are not as important as prior studies argued, since
only 4 firm-specific variables can predict the CDS spreads changes one month ahead. One
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may argue that such findings might result from our previous data treatment of filling zero
values for the missing observations. Besides, since some firm-specific variables are updated on
a quarterly basis, such as firm’s accounting-related variables, the monthly variations of these
variables are not observable. Therefore, the reasons related to zero-value observations might
the main attribute to the low predicability of CDS spread variation that are not explained by
systematic factors, then our augment on the firm-specific variables may be overestimated.
In order to answer the concern, we repeat the Equation (2) model specification only for
non-zero observations. In addition, we remove three variables – CBPrice, CBCnt, and CBVol
– because these variables are available only after 2012.8 If the hypothesis that our results of
idiosyncratic variations are purely driven by zero observations is true, we expect substantial
improvement in statistical significance of firm-specific variables and model fitness.
Table 15 reports the results for including only non-zero firm-specific observations. We ob-
serve substantial drop in sample size by 37% (from 40339 to 25361). However, we do not find
substantial changes in the regression results between non-zero observations (Table 15) and full
observations (Table 9). In fact, we find the two tables are qualitatively similar in terms of
variable significance and model fitness. We find the model fitness is slightly improved from
8% to 9%; still, only 4 firm-specific variables provide statistical prediction (at 5% level) and
the composition of the significance variables are largely the same as those in the main results.
CDSContr and DERatio remain statistically significant predictors. We see mild changes in sta-
tistical significance for firm’s fundamental variables. E.g, CashRatio and StoMom (replacing
NIMTA and StoPrice) become predictors in the case of non-zero observations. All in all we
find that our arguments are not driven by zero observations.
[Table 15 is around here.]
8Since the complete set of firm-specific variables are changed, we re-do the VIF analysis on multicollinearity
test, and it turns out ROA is also dropped.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we study the factors to the monthly changes of the 5-year credit default swap
(CDS) from January 2001 to June 2018. We divide the factors into systematic and firm-
specific factors and study their effects separately using a novel two-step approach. We first run
individual time-series regressions of CDS spreads on the list of systematic factors for each CDS
underlying firms; in the second step, we regress the unexplained part taken from the first-step
regressions on a set of CDS firm-specific factors identified in literature. The two-step regression
procedure enables us to understand the separate importance of the systematic and firm-specific
effects.
Two research questions are studied in this paper. The first research question is “Which
and to what extent systematic factors can explain the individual CDS spread variations?”. We
propose 8 systematic factors (of which 5 systematic factors are exogenous and 3 systematic
factors are endogenous) to capture the systematic risks of the monthly changes in the CDS
spread. We find that the proposed systematic factors have strong explanatory power in the CDS
spread changes. In addition, the systematic factors include both exogenous and endogenous risk
factors, the significance of both types of factors indicates that the individual corporate CDS is
affected by both information from other financial markets and their peer CDSs. Our findings in
systematic factors further strengthen the importance of price co-movement in individual CDSs.
Our second research question is “Which and to what extent the firm-specific factors can
predict CDS spread variations that are not explained by systematic factors?”. To isolate the
firm-specific effect on the CDS spread changes apart from systematic factors, we regress the
unexplained part from the CDS systematic factors on a comprehensive set of the firm-specific
variables. We find that most of the firm-specific variables exhibit insignificance on CDS varia-
tions predictability and the overall predictability power (R2) is weak. However, we identify 4
firm-specific variables provide independent and predictive information for the monthly changes
of the CDS spread, while additional 5 firm-specific can only explain the CDS spread varia-
tion contemporaneously. Overall only one-third of the firm-specific variables included in this
study show statistical significance in explaining CDS spread movement; we cast doubt on the
importance of the firm-specific CDS determinants.
Combining our findings altogether, we conclude that CDS variations are not dominantly
determined by firm-specific information as suggested in prior studies; instead, systematic factors
may play more an important role in explaining individual CDS dynamics. Our argument is
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not altered with additional robustness checks. Our findings shed light on the literature in the
understanding of the importance of systematic factors and firm-specific variables in explaining
CDS spread variations.
For research limitation, our identification of the systematic factors and firm-specific variables
that provide independent information on the monthly changes of the CDS spread is subject to
our current dataset. One may end up with different conclusion on important set of variables
(especially firm-specific variables). However, to avoid the potentiality of data snooping and
selection bias, we use, to our best, the most objective method to include the systematic and
firm-specific variables from a long list of literature. Finally, our results are also beneficial for
future empirical research on CDS determinants. When studying the price impact on CDS
spread, one should use all the CDS systematic factors and at least include our identified firm-
specific variables, in order to conclude unbiased results.
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Table 1: List of Literature on CDS Determinants
This table lists the publications on CDS determinants. We include only journal
publications of empirical studies on CDS determinants. In addition, we exclude
sovereign CDS studies and studies on CDS indexes or CDS portfolios. For the
short-listed studies on individual CDS, we first read the article abstract and decide
subjectively whether or not this article fits in our inclusion criteria. If the article of
interest is related to CDS determinants, then we further read the article’s empirical
results and categorize the article into one of three groups–Systematic, Firm-specific
and Both, depending on what factors the article used in the empirical results. ∗
indicates that the study uses systematic variables just as control variables.
Year Literature Sys Ft. Firm Ft. Both
2005 Blanco et al. (2005) x
2009 Callen et al. (2009) x
2009 Das et al. (2009) x∗
2009 Das and Hanouna (2009) x∗
2009 Ericsson et al. (2009) x
2009 Norden and Weber (2009) x
2010 Cao et al. (2010) x∗
2011 Bongaerts et al. (2011) x
2013 Annaert et al. (2013) x∗
2013 Chiaramonte and Casu (2013) x
2013 Coró et al. (2013) x∗
2013 Coudert and Gex (2013) x
2014 Galil et al. (2014) x
2014 Mayordomo et al. (2014) x
2015 Hilscher et al. (2015) x
2015 Pires et al. (2015) x
2016 Bai and Wu (2016) x
2017 Tang and Yan (2017) x∗
2018 Pereira et al. (2018) x
2019 Lee et al. (2018) x
2019 Lin et al. (2019) x
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Table 2: Firm-specific Variable Definitions
This table reports all the firm-specific variable definitions used in the study, including the relevant reference.
Panel A: Accounting and Market Mixed Ratios
Variable Definition Relevant Literature
CASHMTA Cash equivalent assets divided by market value of asset, where market value of
asset is calculated by market cap and book value of liabilities.
Campbell et al. (2008).
DERatio Debt-to-Equity Ratio, defined as total debt divided by market cap. Annaert et al. (2013), Bai and Wu (2016) , Callen et al. (2009), Campbell
et al. (2008), Cao et al. (2010), Tang and Yan (2017).
LLB LLB is the sum of current liabilities and half of long-term liabilities divided by
market cap.
Bai and Wu (2016).
MBRatio Market-to-Book Ratio, defined as market cap divided by book value of equity. Anderson (2017), Campbell et al. (2008).
NIMTA Net income divided by market value of asset, where market value of asset is
calculated by market cap and book value of liabilities.
Campbell et al. (2008), Pires et al. (2015).
RealVol Realized Volatility is calculated by historical volatility of monthly stock return
over past 12 months.
Alexander and Kaeck (2008), Annaert et al. (2013), Bai and Wu (2016),
Campbell et al. (2008), Cao et al. (2010), Ericsson et al. (2009), Das
et al. (2009), Mayordomo et al. (2014), Tang and Yan (2017).
TLMTA Total liabilities divided by market value of asset, where market value of asset
is calculated by market cap and book value of liabilities.
Campbell et al. (2008), Ericsson et al. (2009), Pires et al. (2015).
Panel B: Balance Sheet Items and Ratios
Asset The natural logarithm of firm’s total asset value. Anderson (2017), Das et al. (2009), Mayordomo et al. (2014), Tang and
Yan (2017).
CARatio Cash-to-Asset Ratio, defined as cash equivalent assets divided by total asset. Anderson (2017), Das et al. (2009), Tang and Yan (2017).
CashRatio Cash Ratio, defined as cash equivelent assets divided by total liability. Anderson (2017), Das et al. (2009), Tang and Yan (2017).
DARatio Debt-to-Asset Ratio, defined as total debt divided by total asset. Anderson (2017), Bai and Wu (2016), Mayordomo et al. (2014).
Liab Total Liabilities, defined as total liability divided by total asset. Das et al. (2009).
QuickRatio Quick Ratio, defined as current asset divided by current liability. Das et al. (2009).
ReEarning Retained Earnings, defined as retained earning divided by total asset. Bai and Wu (2016), Das et al. (2009).
WorkingCap Working Capital, calculated as the difference between current asset and current
liabilities divided by total asset.
Bai and Wu (2016)
Panel C: Financial Market Items and Ratios
CBCnt CB Trade Count, defined as the natural logarithm of the CB trade count
(month-end).
Tang and Yan (2017).
CBPrice Month-end Corporate Bond Yield. Annaert et al. (2013), Coudert and Gex (2013), Norden and Weber
(2009).
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CBVol CB Trade Volume, defined as the natural logarithm of the CB trade volume
(month-end).
Tang and Yan (2017).
MktCap Market cap, defined as underlying stock price multiplied by its shares outstand-
ing.
Anderson (2017), Bai and Wu (2016), Callen et al. (2009), Campbell
et al. (2008), Pires et al. (2015).
StoMom The stock return in the previous month is used as stock momentum proxy. Bai and Wu (2016).
StoPrice Underlying stock price, calculated as the natural logarithm of stock price. Alexander and Kaeck (2008), Annaert et al. (2013), citetBlanco2005,
Callen et al. (2009), Campbell et al. (2008), Cao et al. (2010), Fung
et al. (2008), Das et al. (2009), Hilscher et al. (2015), Norden and Weber
(2009), Tang and Yan (2017).
StoVol Implied Volatility to Realized Volatility Ratio, defined as the natural logarithm
of the option implied volatility (DELTA = 0.25) divided by realized volatility.
Alexander and Kaeck (2008), Bai and Wu (2016), Cao et al. (2010), Pires
et al. (2015).
Panel D: Income Statement Items and Ratios
EBIT Earning Before Interest and Tax (EBIT), calculated as EBIT divided by total
asset.
Bai and Wu (2016).
IntCover Interest Coverage, defined as EBIT divided by interest expense. Das et al. (2009).
Inv2COGS Inventory-to-COGS Ratio, defined as inventory divided by cost of good sold
(COGS).
Das et al. (2009).
NIGrowth Net Income Growth, defined as quarterly changes in net income divided by its
current amount.
Das et al. (2009).
ROA Return of Asset, defined as net income divided by total asset value. Anderson (2017), Callen et al. (2009), Das et al. (2009).
SaleGrowth Sale Growth, calculated as the quarterly changes in sales divided by its current
amount.
Das et al. (2009).
Panel E: Liquidity Measures
StoAmihud The Amihud (2002) measure of the underlying stock over one year. Das et al. (2009), Lin et al. (2019).
CDSAmihud The Amihud (2002) measure of the CDS spreads over one year. Lin et al. (2019).
CDSHL The high-minus-low of the 5-year CDS spread over one month. Lin et al. (2019).
CDSSlope The difference between 5-year CDS and 1-year CDS spreads Lin et al. (2019).
CDSContr The number of contributors to 5-year CDS quotes Bongaerts et al. (2011).
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics
This table reports the descriptive statistics of all the variables used in this pa-
per, including sample mean, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, and quintile
statistics. The sample period is from January 2001 to June 2018. Panel A reports
the statistics for the eight systematic factors and Panel B reports the firm-specific
variables.
Variables # Obs Mean STD Min 25% 50% 75% Max
Panel A: Systematic Factors
DftSpr 197 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03
TrmSpr 197 0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04
VIX 197 19.24 8.28 9.51 13.45 16.74 22.72 59.89
SP500 197 7.26 0.32 6.60 7.03 7.19 7.54 7.95
TB5Y 197 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.05
AvgSpr 197 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.07
AvgSpr R
i. AA Rating 184 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02
ii. A Rating 197 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
iii. BBB Rating 197 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.05
iv. BB Rating 197 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.09
v. B Rating 197 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.16
vi. C Rating 197 0.09 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.11 0.54
AvgSpr S
i. Basic Materials 197 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.08
ii. Consumer Goods 197 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.06
iii. Consumer
Services
197 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.24
iv. Energy 197 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.20
v. Healthcare 197 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03
vi. Industrials 197 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.05
vii. Technology 197 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.07
viii. Telecom
Services
197 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.18
ix. Utilities 197 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.07
Panel B: Firm-specific Variables
Asset 37676 23.37 1.22 19.54 22.53 23.41 24.21 26.82
CARatio 37676 0.09 0.10 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.12 0.73
CASHMTA (%) 37535 0.01% 0.03% 0.00% 0.00% 0.01% 0.01% 0.82%
CashRatio 36212 0.45 0.63 0.00 0.11 0.26 0.54 9.05
CBCnt 12338 2.92 1.38 0.00 1.95 2.94 3.90 7.54
CBPrice 12227 0.03 0.03 -0.88 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.87
CBVol 12338 14.64 2.25 0.00 13.30 14.97 16.23 20.35
CDSAmihud 40306 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10
CDSHL 40585 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.48
CDSSlope 38993 0.00 0.01 -0.73 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.10
CDSContr 41044 6.35 3.92 2.00 3.00 5.00 8.00 30.00
DARatio 37299 0.31 0.16 0.00 0.20 0.29 0.39 1.90
DERatio 37164 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11
EBIT 37043 0.01 0.01 -0.13 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.19
IntCover 36938 22.30 401.36 -211.79 2.59 5.80 12.25 28934.20
Inv2COGS 37103 2.34 2.60 -0.33 0.79 1.81 2.86 49.21
Liab 37670 0.66 0.19 0.14 0.54 0.65 0.76 2.32
LLB 36071 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09
MBRatio (103) 37535 828.07 45517.86 -
4247933.42
486.67 763.66 1238.75 1126718.30
MktCap 38634 30.06 1.49 24.42 28.99 30.12 31.03 34.45
NIGrowth 37283 0.25 41.26 -821.00 -0.47 -0.04 0.31 4274.33
NIMTA 37526 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
QuickRatio 36101 1.59 0.86 0.20 1.03 1.38 1.91 10.66
RealVol 35225 0.29 0.23 0.06 0.17 0.23 0.33 6.49
ReEarning 36945 0.25 0.42 -3.07 0.09 0.27 0.45 2.07
ROA 37661 0.00 0.01 -0.14 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.18
SaleGrowth 37289 0.02 0.20 -0.82 -0.05 0.01 0.08 5.55
StoAmihud 38404 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.24
StoMom 35225 0.04 0.35 -2.98 -0.10 0.07 0.22 4.58
StoPrice 38634 3.61 0.82 -2.98 3.20 3.73 4.14 6.87
StoVol 31356 0.22 0.35 -2.01 0.06 0.25 0.43 1.71
TLMTA 37535 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14
WorkingCap 36101 0.11 0.14 -0.62 0.00 0.09 0.20 0.77
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Table 4: Firm-specific Variable VIF
This table reports the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) analysis for the 28 firm-
specific variable. The sample period is from January 2001 to June 2018. We use
the monthly changes of the variable in the VIF analysis. We drop one variable with
the highest VIF value for each procedure until no VIF value is more than 7. The
final VIFs are reported in the last column.
Variable Initial VIF Final VIF
∆Asset 1.78 1.52
∆CARatio 8.81 dropped
∆CASHMTA 5.54 3.30
∆CashRatio 7.57 3.43
∆CBCnt 1.89 1.89
∆CBPrice 1.01 1.01
∆CBVol 1.89 1.89
∆CDSAmihud 1.60 1.60
∆CDSHL 1.61 1.61
∆CDSSlope 1.02 1.02
∆CDSContr 1.01 1.01
∆DARatio 2.99 1.97
∆DERatio 11.87 3.79
∆EBIT 5.89 5.88
∆IntCover 4.31 4.31
∆Inv2COGS 1.35 1.34
∆Liab 3.34 2.70
∆LLB 16.81 dropped
∆MBRatio 2.50 2.31
∆MktCap 17.24 dropped
∆NIGrowth 1.24 1.24
∆NIMTA 5.27 5.20
∆QuickRatio 9.41 dropped
∆RealVol 1.95 1.94
∆ReEarning 2.01 1.98
∆ROA 7.06 6.99
∆SaleGrowth 1.47 1.47
∆StoAmihud 1.06 1.06
∆StoMom 1.73 1.73
∆StoPrice 13.46 4.57
∆StoVol 1.93 1.93
∆TLMTA 29.16 dropped
∆WorkingCap 7.86 1.66
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Table 5: Contemporaneous CDS Systematic Factors
This table reports the regression results for contemporaneous systematic factors for
the 259 U.S. firms over the sample period from January 2001 to June 2018. We
perform time-series regressions for each firm, and report the average coefficients, the
percentage of statistical significance at 5%, and the average adjusted R2 for the 259
regressions. ∆ is the operator of variable monthly change. The left panel reports the
univariate regressions and the right panel reports the univariate regressions. Newey-
West t-statistics with 12-month lags is used for testing coefficient significance.
Dependent Variable: ∆Spr (i,t)
Multivariate Regression Univariate Regression
Coef %(p ≤ 0.05) Coef %(p ≤ 0.05) Adj. R2
∆DftSpr (t) 4.791 (36.29%) 26.864 (68.34%) 0.05
∆TrmSpr (t) 0.701 (16.60%) -6.374 (22.78%) 0.01
∆VIX (t) -0.0001 (12.74%) 0.009 (70.27%) 0.07
∆SP500 (t) -0.270 (22.39%) -1.386 (79.92%) 0.13
∆TB5Y (t) -2.927 (19.31%) -14.346 (70.66%) 0.06
∆AvgSpr (t) 0.138 (38.22%) 0.368 (64.09%) 0.11
∆AvgSpr R (t) 0.290 (65.64%) 0.414 (81.85%) 0.20
∆AvgSpr S (t) 0.318 (55.60%) 0.421 (59.46%) 0.16
Const 0.002 (6.18%)
Adj. R2 0.35
#Obs 40431
#Firm 259
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Table 6: Lagged CDS Systematic Factors
This table reports the regression results for systematic factors lagged by one month
for the 259 U.S. firms over the sample period from January 2001 to June 2018. ∆ is
the operator of variable monthly change. We perform time-series regressions for each
firm, and report the average coefficients, the percentage of statistical significance at
5% (in parentheses), and the average adjusted R2 for the 259 regressions. The left
panel reports the multivariate regressions and the right panel reports the univariate
regressions. Newey-West t-statistics with 12-month lags is used for testing coefficient
significance.
Dependent Variable: ∆Spr (i,t)
Multivariate Regression Univariate Regression
Coef %(p ≤ 0.05) Coef %(p ≤ 0.05) Adj. R2
∆DftSpr (t-1) 10.379 (33.20%) 14.845 (49.81%) 0.02
∆TrmSpr (t-1) 5.974 (27.80%) 5.183 (19.31%) 0.01
∆VIX (t-1) 0.005 (37.45%) 0.006 (45.95%) 0.03
∆SP500 (t-1) 0.118 (15.44%) -0.484 (32.05%) 0.02
∆TB5Y (t-1) -0.994 (9.27%) -0.231 (11.20%) 0.00
∆AvgSpr (t-1) 0.038 (15.44%) 0.125 (27.03%) 0.01
∆AvgSpr R (t-1) 0.023 (13.51%) 0.070 (15.06%) 0.01
∆AvgSpr S (t-1) 0.061 (14.29%) 0.095 (24.71%) 0.01
Const 0.000 (3.86%)
Adj. R2 0.05
#Obs 40129
#Firm 259
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Table 7: Systematic Factor Panel Regression
This table reports the panel regression on contemporaneous CDS systematic factors
over the sample period from January 2001 to June 2018. ∆ is the operator of
variable monthly change. Firm fixed effect is controlled in the panel regression. We
use heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (with 12-month lags) robust standard
errors to test coefficient significance. t-statistics is reported in square parentheses.
Statistical significance of 5% is expressed in italic and bold.
Dependent Variable: ∆Spr (i,t)
∆DftSpr (t) 6.995
[2.68]
∆TrmSpr (t) 0.579
[0.43]
∆VIX (t) 0.000
[0.20]
∆SP500 (t) -0.463
[-1.79]
∆TB5Y (t) -4.808
[-2.96]
∆AvgSpr (t) 0.138
[3.01]
∆AvgSpr R (t) 0.318
[5.86]
∆AvgSpr S (t) 0.242
[3.47]
Adj. R2 0.28
#Obs 40558
Firm FE Yes
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Table 8: Sub-sample CDS Systematic Factors
This table reports the regression results for contemporaneous systematic factors for the 259 U.S. firms by sectors, ratings, and
periods. ∆ is the operator of variable monthly change. We perform multivariate time-series regressions for each firm, and report
the average coefficients, the percentage of statistical significance at 5% (in parentheses), and the average adjusted R2 for the 259
regressions. Newey-West t-statistics with 12-month lags is used to test coefficient significance.
Dependent Variable: ∆Spr (i,t)
Sector Rating Period
Materials ConGoods ConServicesEnergy Healthcare Industrials Tech Telecom Utilities AA A BBB BB B CCC PreCrisis InCrisis PostCrisis
∆DftSpr (t) 8.383 9.261 1.998 20.913 1.258 2.542 -0.411 0.947 -0.792 1.869 1.144 9.447 7.602 -0.191 0.165 6.616 -2.341 -0.872
?%(p ≤ 0.05) (36.36%) (37.78%) (26.47%) (57.14%) (19.05%) (37.25%) (21.74%) (36.36%) (51.61%) (26.47%) (40.30%) (29.31%) (45.21%) (31.58%) (25.00%) (13.86%) (46.08%) (20.58%)
∆TrmSpr (t) -0.354 1.030 -1.785 -5.281 3.945 2.753 2.121 0.667 1.134 0.635 1.965 -1.797 0.571 4.454 0.769 -1.324 -1.934 4.189
(4.55%) (15.56%) (26.47%) (33.33%) (19.05%) (13.73%) (4.35%) (54.55%) (3.23%) (5.88%) (16.42%) (18.97%) (21.92%) (10.53%) (12.50%) (23.76%) (46.08%) (18.52%)
∆VIX (t) -0.002 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.003 0.003 -0.002
(9.09%) (11.11%) (14.71%) (19.05%) (4.76%) (9.80%) (26.09%) (18.18%) (9.68%) (5.88%) (13.43%) (10.34%) (16.44%) (10.53%) (25.00%) (19.31%) (52.53%) (11.11%)
∆SP500 (t) -0.586 -0.350 -0.533 -0.580 0.179 -0.380 -0.034 0.410 0.031 -0.343 0.021 -0.197 -0.587 -0.312 0.074 0.364 0.789 -0.660
(36.36%) (26.67%) (35.29%) (23.81%) (4.76%) (17.65%) (34.78%) (9.09%) (6.45%) (17.65%) (14.93%) (17.24%) (32.88%) (36.84%) (12.50%) (17.82%) (58.06%) (30.04%)
∆TB5Y (t) -2.363 -4.057 -1.185 2.518 -5.143 -4.638 -3.525 -2.693 -2.606 -3.336 -3.762 -2.258 -2.224 -3.566 -3.931 -1.008 -2.915 -4.074
(13.64%) (13.33%) (23.53%) (9.52%) (23.81%) (21.57%) (26.09%) (27.27%) (19.35%) (17.65%) (23.88%) (15.52%) (19.18%) (15.79%) (25.00%) (18.32%) (56.22%) (16.87%)
∆AvgSpr (t) 0.047 -0.052 -0.026 0.291 0.269 0.256 0.266 0.050 0.208 0.167 0.135 0.131 0.144 0.149 0.010 0.227 0.209 0.106
(18.18%) (6.67%) (14.71%) (71.43%) (61.90%) (58.82%) (69.57%) (0.00%) (41.94%) (38.24%) (35.82%) (37.93%) (38.36%) (42.11%) (50.00%) (42.08%) (60.83%) (29.63%)
∆AvgSpr R (t) 0.273 0.186 0.306 0.350 0.261 0.411 0.279 0.292 0.223 0.324 0.432 0.232 0.227 0.225 0.103 0.431 0.596 0.246
(63.64%) (33.33%) (55.88%) (90.48%) (85.71%) (82.35%) (82.61%) (45.45%) (61.29%) (73.53%) (77.61%) (51.72%) (63.01%) (68.42%) (50.00%) (52.48%) (67.74%) (62.96%)
∆AvgSpr S (t) 0.151 0.287 0.187 0.316 0.513 0.200 0.484 0.712 0.425 0.244 0.303 0.273 0.351 0.436 0.495 0.333 0.500 0.364
(22.73%) (55.56%) (32.35%) (76.19%) (71.43%) (49.02%) (69.57%) (63.64%) (77.42%) (58.82%) (58.21%) (51.72%) (54.79%) (63.16%) (37.50%) (46.53%) (57.60%) (46.91%)
Const 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003 -0.002 -0.006 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.003 0.006 0.003 -0.006 0.016 0.005
(4.55%) (2.22%) (11.76%) (4.76%) (9.52%) (5.88%) (4.35%) (18.18%) (3.23%) (5.88%) (1.49%) (5.17%) (10.96%) (10.53%) (0.00%) (7.92%) (43.78%) (11.93%)
Adj. R2 0.26 0.30 0.36 0.52 0.36 0.34 0.37 0.42 0.31 0.33 0.37 0.28 0.37 0.40 0.42 0.31 0.58 0.35
#Obs 3582 7677 5228 3091 3356 7796 3442 1587 4672 5125 11679 8814 10920 2845 1048 11999 4055 22542
#Firm 22 45 34 21 21 51 23 11 31 34 67 58 73 19 8 202 217 243
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Table 9: Firm-specific Variable Prediction
This table reports the panel regression results for firm-specific variables over the
sample period from January 2001 to June 2018. ∆ is the operator of variable
monthly change. The dependent variable is the unexplained CDS spread changes
by the systematic factors and the independent variables are the firm-specific charac-
teristics lagged by one period. Left panel reports the multivariate panel regression
and right panel reports the univariate regression. Firm fixed effect and time fixed
effect are controlled in the regression. We use heteroskedasticity and autocorre-
lation (with 12-month lags) robust standard errors to test coefficient significance.
t-statistics is reported in square parentheses. Statistical significance of 5% is ex-
pressed in italic and bold.
Dependent Variable: ∆Idio (i,t)
Multivariate Regression Univariate Regression
Coef t-stats Coef t-stats Adj. R2
∆Asset(i,t-1) 0.000 [-0.07] 0.001 [0.16] 0.07
∆CASHMTA(i,t-1) 0.001 [0.07] 0.017 [3.22] 0.07
∆CashRatio(i,t-1) -0.008 [-0.92] -0.006 [-1.35] 0.07
∆CBCnt(i,t-1) 0.015 [1.34] 0.017 [2.08] 0.07
∆CBPrice(i,t-1) 0.004 [0.41] 0.009 [0.81] 0.07
∆CBVol(i,t-1) 0.002 [0.29] 0.012 [1.74] 0.07
∆CDSAmihud(i,t-1) 0.010 [0.82] 0.000 [0.02] 0.07
∆CDSHL(i,t-1) -0.022 [-1.73] -0.012 [-1.31] 0.07
∆CDSSlope(i,t-1) 0.005 [0.84] 0.006 [1.06] 0.07
∆CDSContr(i,t-1) -0.020 [-2.71] -0.021 [-2.70] 0.07
∆DARatio(i,t-1) -0.009 [-1.20] 0.007 [1.50] 0.07
∆DERatio(i,t-1) 0.023 [2.09] 0.049 [5.93] 0.07
∆EBIT(i,t-1) -0.001 [-0.08] -0.016 [-3.08] 0.07
∆IntCover(i,t-1) -0.007 [-0.86] -0.016 [-3.68] 0.07
∆Inv2COGS(i,t-1) -0.007 [-1.28] 0.000 [-0.04] 0.07
∆Liab(i,t-1) 0.004 [0.35] 0.013 [1.98] 0.07
∆MBRatio(i,t-1) -0.001 [-0.23] -0.032 [-4.05] 0.07
∆NIGrowth(i,t-1) -0.003 [-0.51] -0.010 [-2.23] 0.07
∆NIMTA(i,t-1) -0.024 [-2.18] -0.015 [-2.54] 0.07
∆RealVol(i,t-1) 0.005 [0.71] 0.006 [1.00] 0.07
∆ReEarning(i,t-1) -0.010 [-1.15] -0.015 [-2.68] 0.07
∆ROA(i,t-1) 0.016 [1.10] -0.017 [-2.74] 0.07
∆SaleGrowth(i,t-1) -0.008 [-1.18] -0.008 [-1.58] 0.07
∆StoAmihud(i,t-1) 0.006 [0.99] 0.010 [1.39] 0.07
∆StoMom(i,t-1) 0.017 [1.71] -0.030 [-4.00] 0.07
∆StoPrice(i,t-1) -0.058 [-3.43] -0.061 [-6.01] 0.07
∆StoVol(i,t-1) 0.002 [0.31] 0.004 [0.64] 0.07
∆WorkingCap(i,t-1) 0.005 [1.00] -0.004 [-0.94] 0.07
Adj. R2 0.08
#Obs 40339
Firm FE Yes
Time FE Yes
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Table 10: Firm-specific Variable Contemporaneous Panel Regression
This table reports the panel regression results for firm-specific variables over the
sample period from January 2001 to June 2018. ∆ is the operator of variable
monthly change. The dependent variable is the unexplained CDS spread changes
by the systematic factors and the independent variables are the contemporaneous
firm-specific characteristics. Firm fixed effect and time fixed effect are controlled
in the regression. We use heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (with 12-month
lags) robust standard errors to test coefficient significance. t-statistics is reported
in square parentheses. Statistical significance of 5% is expressed in italic and bold.
Dependent Variable: ∆Idio (i,t)
Coef t-stats
∆Asset(i,t) -0.009 [-1.62]
∆CASHMTA(i,t) 0.035 [3.44]
∆CashRatio(i,t) -0.041 [-4.38]
∆CBCnt(i,t) 0.009 [0.59]
∆CBPrice(i,t) 0.019 [1.88]
∆CBVol(i,t) 0.005 [0.41]
∆CDSAmihud(i,t) -0.005 [-0.27]
∆CDSHL(i,t) 0.132 [3.68]
∆CDSSlope(i,t) 0.207 [3.54]
∆CDSContr(i,t) 0.045 [7.19]
∆DARatio(i,t) -0.008 [-0.98]
∆DERatio(i,t) 0.044 [3.78]
∆EBIT(i,t) 0.006 [0.56]
∆IntCover(i,t) 0.006 [0.52]
∆Inv2COGS(i,t) 0.003 [0.74]
∆Liab(i,t) -0.009 [-1.22]
∆MBRatio(i,t) 0.013 [1.85]
∆NIGrowth(i,t) 0.005 [0.95]
∆NIMTA(i,t) -0.052 [-3.18]
∆RealVol(i,t) 0.014 [1.26]
∆ReEarning(i,t) 0.010 [0.99]
∆ROA(i,t) 0.035 [1.84]
∆SaleGrowth(i,t) 0.002 [0.34]
∆StoAmihud(i,t) 0.015 [2.39]
∆StoMom(i,t) 0.017 [1.40]
∆StoPrice(i,t) -0.116 [-7.79]
∆StoVol(i,t) 0.012 [1.17]
∆WorkingCap(i,t) 0.006 [1.32]
Adj. R2 0.15
#Obs 40431
Firm FE Yes
Time FE Yes
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Table 11: Sub-sample Firm-specific Variable Prediction
This table reports the panel regression results for firm-specific variables by sectors, ratings, and periods. ∆ is the operator of variable
monthly change. The dependent variable is the unexplained CDS spread changes by the systematic factors and the independent
variables are the contemporaneous firm-specific characteristics. Firm fixed effect and time fixed effect are controlled in the regression.
We use heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (with 12-month lags) robust standard errors to test coefficient significance. t-statistics
is reported in square parentheses. Statistical significance of 5% is expressed in italic and bold. The first row reports the counts of
variables with 5% statistical significance.
Dependent Variable: ∆Idio (i,t)
Sector Rating Period
Materials ConGoods ConServicesEnergy Healthcare Industrials Tech Telecom Utilities AA A BBB BB B CCC PreCrisis InCrisis PostCrisis
?#(p ≤ 0.05) 0 4 3 2 0 1 6 2 3 1 6 3 3 0 2 3 6 2
∆Asset (i,t-1) -0.016 -0.009 0.016 0.008 -0.013 0.010 -0.006 -0.055 0.080 0.018 0.005 -0.008 -0.011 -0.001 -0.026 0.002 -0.034 0.000
t-stats [-0.61] [-0.58] [0.77] [0.33] [-0.55] [0.61] [-0.29] [-1.49] [2.12] [0.92] [0.38] [-0.59] [-0.92] [-0.03] [-0.51] [0.20] [-2.69] [-0.03]
∆CASHMTA(i,t-1) -0.013 0.030 -0.061 0.032 0.028 0.000 0.061 -0.131 0.001 -0.038 -0.009 0.003 0.012 0.000 0.061 -0.016 0.022 0.006
[-0.37] [1.61] [-3.02] [0.87] [0.66] [0.02] [2.08] [-1.90] [0.03] [-1.40] [-0.41] [0.13] [0.59] [-0.00] [1.09] [-0.96] [1.15] [0.50]
∆CashRatio(i,t-1) 0.012 -0.019 0.062 -0.045 -0.057 -0.021 -0.018 0.194 -0.038 0.019 0.003 -0.027 -0.006 -0.022 -0.109 -0.008 -0.031 -0.005
[0.39] [-0.98] [2.34] [-1.79] [-1.41] [-0.86] [-0.60] [1.90] [-1.09] [0.83] [0.14] [-1.25] [-0.26] [-0.68] [-2.12] [-0.43] [-1.17] [-0.43]
∆CBCnt(i,t-1) 0.015 -0.005 0.013 0.070 0.028 0.016 0.016 0.103 -0.007 0.003 0.001 0.046 0.004 -0.028 0.044 0.010
[0.33] [-0.40] [0.48] [1.48] [0.57] [0.57] [0.93] [1.04] [-0.22] [0.11] [0.05] [1.58] [0.16] [-0.72] [0.26] [0.85]
∆CBPrice(i,t-1) -0.036 -0.004 -0.035 -0.045 0.026 0.023 0.004 -0.003 0.090 0.007 0.013 -0.004 0.007 -0.006 -0.145 0.001
[-1.59] [-0.27] [-1.32] [-1.72] [1.22] [1.25] [0.12] [-0.11] [4.96] [0.17] [0.73] [-0.19] [0.41] [-0.18] [-1.57] [0.10]
∆CBVol(i,t-1) -0.006 0.023 -0.013 -0.062 0.013 -0.015 0.028 -0.060 0.014 0.011 0.011 -0.022 0.009 0.012 -0.179 0.003
[-0.22] [1.12] [-0.31] [-1.38] [0.30] [-0.55] [1.12] [-0.79] [0.48] [0.32] [0.81] [-1.08] [0.55] [0.26] [-1.25] [0.33]
∆CDSAmihud(i,t-1) 0.031 0.029 0.013 0.016 -0.022 0.008 0.070 -0.015 -0.025 0.038 -0.014 0.027 0.025 0.015 0.057 -0.008 0.070 0.003
[0.95] [1.29] [0.56] [0.63] [-0.53] [0.29] [3.05] [-0.43] [-1.01] [1.59] [-0.91] [1.28] [1.25] [0.47] [0.86] [-0.66] [1.32] [0.26]
∆CDSHL(i,t-1) -0.033 -0.024 -0.029 -0.040 0.011 -0.029 -0.060 0.014 0.008 -0.045 -0.039 -0.012 -0.014 -0.018 -0.081 -0.010 -0.067 -0.004
[-1.05] [-1.17] [-1.06] [-1.66] [0.38] [-1.20] [-2.20] [0.34] [0.42] [-1.65] [-2.29] [-0.94] [-0.87] [-0.49] [-1.18] [-0.51] [-2.76] [-0.40]
∆CDSSlope(i,t-1) -0.034 -0.002 0.000 0.021 0.042 -0.002 0.032 0.000 0.009 0.007 0.039 -0.005 -0.021 0.021 -0.056 0.015 0.008 0.000
[-1.59] [-0.12] [-0.02] [1.31] [1.95] [-0.13] [1.43] [-0.01] [0.50] [0.46] [4.82] [-0.35] [-1.75] [0.81] [-0.93] [1.87] [1.06] [0.03]
∆CDSContr(i,t-1) -0.013 -0.019 -0.009 -0.015 -0.027 -0.031 -0.003 -0.059 -0.018 -0.049 -0.037 -0.025 0.004 0.038 -0.015 -0.027 -0.025 -0.005
[-0.59] [-2.03] [-0.55] [-0.66] [-1.51] [-2.53] [-0.16] [-2.05] [-0.77] [-3.19] [-2.98] [-1.87] [0.36] [1.74] [-0.44] [-2.70] [-1.67] [-0.61]
∆DARatio(i,t-1) -0.016 -0.025 0.004 0.020 -0.017 0.003 -0.012 -0.046 0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.015 -0.013 -0.050 0.103 -0.014 -0.034 -0.007
[-0.62] [-1.50] [0.22] [0.66] [-0.48] [0.18] [-0.41] [-0.60] [0.03] [-0.02] [-0.06] [-0.97] [-1.08] [-1.43] [1.72] [-1.01] [-2.40] [-0.96]
∆DERatio(i,t-1) -0.016 0.056 0.034 0.041 -0.019 0.027 -0.040 0.018 -0.023 0.024 0.019 0.056 0.011 0.048 -0.106 0.048 0.004 0.020
[-0.40] [2.11] [1.17] [1.23] [-0.44] [1.03] [-1.42] [0.19] [-0.30] [0.96] [0.94] [2.44] [0.59] [0.92] [-1.89] [2.40] [0.17] [1.69]
∆EBIT(i,t-1) -0.001 0.007 -0.017 0.041 -0.003 -0.030 0.057 -0.303 -0.051 0.025 0.022 -0.056 0.000 0.026 -0.074 0.006 -0.046 0.010
[-0.02] [0.31] [-0.43] [1.04] [-0.09] [-1.00] [2.03] [-1.78] [-0.85] [0.73] [1.50] [-1.99] [0.01] [0.37] [-0.50] [0.27] [-1.35] [0.58]
∆IntCover(i,t-1) 0.021 -0.017 0.003 -0.028 0.001 0.018 -0.087 0.120 0.059 -0.037 -0.007 0.046 -0.025 -0.019 0.062 -0.014 0.052 -0.014
[0.50] [-0.84] [0.11] [-1.17] [0.01] [0.71] [-3.13] [0.89] [0.96] [-1.78] [-0.63] [1.81] [-1.11] [-0.37] [0.43] [-1.35] [2.10] [-1.10]
∆Inv2COGS(i,t-1) 0.019 0.010 -0.009 -0.006 0.011 -0.019 0.013 -0.059 -0.035 -0.004 0.003 0.009 -0.016 -0.021 -0.006 -0.010 0.016 -0.011
[0.84] [0.70] [-0.37] [-0.28] [0.36] [-1.51] [0.55] [-1.71] [-2.23] [-0.31] [0.24] [1.00] [-1.21] [-0.89] [-0.13] [-0.79] [1.39] [-1.68]
∆Liab(i,t-1) 0.010 -0.011 0.018 -0.029 -0.013 -0.004 0.037 -0.033 0.002 -0.018 -0.026 0.022 0.042 -0.006 0.043 0.009 -0.006 -0.006
[0.24] [-0.52] [0.76] [-1.07] [-0.42] [-0.17] [1.05] [-0.63] [0.08] [-0.99] [-1.62] [1.15] [2.39] [-0.14] [0.37] [0.39] [-0.34] [-0.73]
∆MBRatio(i,t-1) 0.007 -0.002 -0.003 0.021 0.000 -0.020 0.024 -0.008 0.051 -0.017 0.005 0.018 -0.012 0.018 -0.063 -0.004 0.017 -0.002
[0.24] [-0.16] [-0.15] [0.82] [0.01] [-1.11] [0.95] [-0.17] [1.56] [-0.76] [0.52] [1.09] [-1.03] [0.87] [-1.57] [-0.41] [1.15] [-0.25]
∆NIGrowth(i,t-1) 0.000 -0.006 0.028 0.012 0.002 -0.010 -0.024 -0.040 0.013 -0.022 -0.007 -0.004 0.007 -0.011 -0.090 0.002 -0.011 -0.001
[-0.03] [-0.44] [1.65] [0.68] [0.12] [-0.82] [-1.10] [-1.20] [0.82] [-1.08] [-0.68] [-0.29] [0.80] [-0.44] [-1.80] [0.13] [-1.34] [-0.18]
∆NIMTA(i,t-1) -0.012 -0.059 -0.004 -0.001 -0.011 -0.028 -0.054 -0.019 0.008 0.009 0.007 -0.067 -0.006 -0.029 0.075 -0.052 -0.042 0.005
[-0.21] [-2.86] [-0.15] [-0.03] [-0.24] [-0.70] [-1.07] [-0.24] [0.17] [0.19] [0.29] [-2.04] [-0.30] [-0.59] [1.83] [-2.33] [-3.09] [0.31]
∆RealVol(i,t-1) -0.052 0.040 -0.026 0.023 -0.025 -0.013 0.008 -0.044 0.019 -0.021 0.027 -0.012 -0.002 -0.015 0.044 0.000 0.002 0.011
[-1.95] [2.15] [-1.34] [1.02] [-1.02] [-0.49] [0.26] [-0.81] [0.80] [-0.76] [1.70] [-0.67] [-0.11] [-0.41] [1.03] [-0.01] [0.10] [1.17]
∆ReEarning(i,t-1) -0.018 -0.008 0.015 -0.050 -0.026 -0.005 0.021 -0.070 0.006 0.003 -0.024 0.003 0.013 -0.013 0.088 -0.022 -0.048 -0.003
[-0.59] [-0.39] [0.87] [-2.12] [-1.14] [-0.28] [0.77] [-1.18] [0.20] [0.15] [-2.23] [0.13] [0.88] [-0.32] [0.69] [-1.54] [-3.41] [-0.50]
∆ROA(i,t-1) -0.009 0.043 -0.007 -0.017 -0.021 0.001 0.046 0.228 -0.009 -0.027 -0.020 0.065 0.011 -0.004 -0.029 0.035 0.056 -0.022
[-0.18] [1.90] [-0.22] [-0.34] [-0.37] [0.02] [0.96] [2.20] [-0.19] [-0.52] [-0.58] [1.91] [0.44] [-0.07] [-0.30] [1.61] [1.68] [-0.94]
∆SaleGrowth(i,t-1) -0.002 0.019 -0.025 -0.027 -0.012 -0.007 -0.023 -0.024 -0.017 0.009 0.000 0.013 -0.023 -0.039 -0.079 -0.009 -0.018 -0.006
[-0.07] [1.08] [-1.10] [-1.20] [-0.41] [-0.45] [-0.81] [-0.64] [-0.70] [0.48] [0.01] [0.91] [-1.99] [-1.44] [-1.47] [-0.51] [-1.15] [-0.99]
∆StoAmihud(i,t-1) 0.020 0.018 -0.007 -0.022 -0.011 0.000 0.036 0.028 -0.010 0.019 -0.011 0.003 0.009 0.006 0.065 [0.01] [0.00] 0.002
[0.93] [1.46] [-0.37] [-0.95] [-0.55] [-0.04] [1.69] [0.50] [-0.66] [0.98] [-1.27] [0.22] [0.61] [0.23] [1.32] [1.21] [0.01] [0.13]
∆StoMom(i,t-1) -0.013 0.023 0.036 0.059 0.035 0.021 0.057 -0.066 -0.008 0.020 0.038 0.002 0.013 0.023 0.018 0.003 -0.005 0.025
[-0.39] [1.42] [1.21] [1.67] [1.13] [0.94] [1.78] [-0.93] [-0.24] [0.86] [2.50] [0.09] [1.02] [0.51] [0.33] [0.13] [-0.47] [3.32]
∆StoPrice(i,t-1) -0.050 -0.033 -0.107 -0.091 -0.075 -0.027 -0.073 -0.008 -0.113 -0.039 -0.070 -0.041 -0.063 -0.041 -0.195 -0.061 -0.043 -0.048
[-1.04] [-1.10] [-2.49] [-1.52] [-1.61] [-1.07] [-2.03] [-0.10] [-1.18] [-1.60] [-2.26] [-1.30] [-3.24] [-0.86] [-4.43] [-1.51] [-1.94] [-3.31]
∆StoVol(i,t-1) -0.024 0.039 -0.038 0.018 -0.015 -0.031 0.003 -0.019 0.043 -0.041 0.006 -0.011 0.018 0.026 0.054 0.013 -0.014 0.003
[-0.91] [1.89] [-1.76] [0.71] [-0.67] [-1.05] [0.11] [-0.48] [1.95] [-1.14] [0.31] [-0.56] [1.31] [0.71] [0.97] [0.80] [-0.74] [0.41]
∆WorkingCap(i,t-1) [0.01] [-0.01] [-0.00] [-0.04] [0.03] [0.02] [-0.02] [-0.01] [0.02] [-0.00] [0.01] [0.01] [0.00] [-0.01] [-0.01] [0.02] [0.01] [-0.00]
[0.28] [-0.75] [-0.10] [-2.00] [0.69] [0.89] [-0.83] [-0.25] [1.16] [-0.09] [0.81] [0.97] [0.09] [-0.37] [-0.17] [1.87] [0.48] [-0.21]
Adj. R2 0.13 0.11 0.16 0.24 0.18 0.13 0.13 0.16 0.17 0.12 0.14 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.23 0.06 0.14 0.07
#Obs 3574 7654 5211 3086 3351 7777 3436 1585 4665 5114 11641 8796 10901 2840 1047 12180 4111 22736
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 12: Systematic Factor VIF
This table reports the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) analysis for the eight sys-
tematic factors. The sample period is from January 2001 to June 2018. We use the
monthly changes of the variables in the VIF analysis.
Variable VIF
∆DftSpr 1.15
∆TrmSpr 1.72
∆VIX 2.29
∆SP500 2.67
∆TB5Y 1.96
∆AvgSpr 1.40
∆AvgSpr R 1.37
∆AvgSpr S 1.40
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Table 13: Systematic Factor Quarterly Regression
This table reports the regression results for systematic factors for the 259 U.S. firms
over the sample period from January 2001 to June 2018. ∆ is the operator of the
variable quarterly change. Firm fixed effect is controlled in the panel regression.
We use heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (with 12-month lags) robust standard
errors to test coefficient significance. t-statistics is reported in square parentheses.
Statistical significance of 5% is expressed in italic and bold.
Dependent Variable.: ∆Spr
Contemporaneous Lagged
∆DftSpr 5.118 3.782
[2.23] [1.66]
∆TrmSpr 4.212 6.399
[2.81] [3.38]
∆VIX 0.001 0.009
[1.22] [5.35]
∆SP500 -0.216 0.169
[-0.91] [0.67]
∆TB5Y -5.129 -2.329
[-3.72] [-0.96]
∆AvgSpr 0.152 0.117
[3.62] [4.55]
∆AvgSpr R 0.439 0.295
[10.01] [9.55]
∆AvgSpr S 0.248 0.193
[3.26] [3.65]
Adj. R2 0.40 0.26
#Obs 39934 39586
Firm FE Yes Yes
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Table 14: Systematic Factors Reverse Regression
This table reports the regression results for systematic factors for the 259 U.S. firms
over the sample period from January 2001 to June 2018. ∆ is the operator of the
variable monthly change. We reverse our two-step methods by first regressing the
CDS spreads on firm-specific variables, to get the idiosyncratic part of the CDS
spreads:
∆ log (CDSi,t) = γ1∆X
f
i,t + ut + vi +∆Idioi,t,
where Xf is a set of the firm-specific variables listed in Table 2, u and v are time
and firm fixed effects respectively, and the ∆Idioi,t is the residual, unexplained of
the firm-specific variables. Then we regress the ∆Idioi,t on the systematic factors:
∆Idioi,t = β1∆X
s
t + vi + εi,t,
where Xs is a set of systematic factors and v are firm fixed effects. We use het-
eroskedasticity and autocorrelation (with 12-month lags) robust standard errors to
test coefficient significance. t-statistics is reported in square parentheses. Statistical
significance of 5% is expressed in italic and bold.
Dependent Variable: ∆Idio (i,t)
∆DftSpr (t) -3.232
[-1.31]
∆TrmSpr (t) -12.202
[-5.34]
∆VIX (t) 0.000
[-0.17]
∆SP500 (t) 0.774
[6.12]
∆TB5Y (t) 4.974
[2.84]
∆AvgSpr (t) 0.484
[7.79]
∆AvgSpr R (t) 0.279
[11.99]
∆AvgSpr S (t) 0.339
[6.97]
Adj. R2 0.07
#Obs 38993
Firm FE Yes
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Table 15: Non-zero Observations
This table reports the panel regression results using the non-zero observations. ∆ is
the operator of variable monthly change. The dependent variable is the unexplained
CDS spread changes by the systematic factors and the independent variables are the
contemporaneous firm-specific characteristics. Firm fixed effect and time fixed effect
are controlled in the regression. We use heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (with
12-month lags) robust standard errors to test coefficient significance. t-statistics is
reported in square parentheses. Statistical significance of 5% is expressed in italic
and bold.
Dependent Variable: ∆Idio (i,t)
Coef t-stats
∆Asset(i,t-1) -0.008 [-0.93]
∆CASHMTA(i,t-1) 0.015 [1.58]
∆CashRatio(i,t-1) -0.026 [-2.21]
∆CDSAmihud(i,t-1) -0.005 [-0.34]
∆CDSHL(i,t-1) -0.022 [-1.46]
∆CDSSlope(i,t-1) -0.001 [-0.09]
∆CDSContr(i,t-1) -0.027 [-2.47]
∆DARatio(i,t-1) -0.008 [-0.85]
∆DERatio(i,t-1) 0.033 [2.22]
∆EBIT(i,t-1) -0.011 [-0.72]
∆IntCover(i,t-1) 0.000 [-0.04]
∆Inv2COGS(i,t-1) -0.011 [-1.83]
∆Liab(i,t-1) 0.004 [0.41]
∆MBRatio(i,t-1) -0.007 [-1.07]
∆NIGrowth(i,t-1) 0.005 [0.65]
∆NIMTA(i,t-1) -0.001 [-0.07]
∆RealVol(i,t-1) 0.021 [1.84]
∆ReEarning(i,t-1) -0.008 [-0.82]
∆SaleGrowth(i,t-1) -0.016 [-1.95]
∆StoAmihud(i,t-1) 0.007 [0.72]
∆StoMom(i,t-1) 0.022 [2.09]
∆StoPrice(i,t-1) -0.036 [-1.95]
∆StoVol(i,t-1) 0.012 [1.06]
∆WorkingCap(i,t-1) 0.011 [1.68]
Adj. R2 0.09
#Obs 25361
Firm FE Yes
Time FE Yes
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Appendix
We use level variables and repeat the regression analyses shown in the main sections. Table A.1
reports the results for contemporaneous time-series regressions of CDS spreads on systematic
factors, Table A.2 reports the lagged time-series regressions of the CDS spreads on systematic
factors, and Table A.3 reports the regression results of systematic factors for sub-samples.
Likewise, Table A.4 and A.5 report the results for firm-specific variables, analogue to Table 9
and 10, respectively. Note that the composition of the firm-specific variables for the level of
CDS spread is slightly different from that for the changes of CDS spread, because we redo our
VIF for the firm-specific variables.
Overall, we find the explanatory power of systematic factors remains strong and most sys-
tematic factors remains statistically significant. The firm-specific variables also remain weak
in predicting and explaining the CDS spread changes. Hence, the conclusion from the level
variables is qualitatively the same as the change variables in the main section. It is worth men-
tioning that although the R2’s are stronger in level variables than in change variables, we find
the coefficients are unstable, indicating that, de facto, CDS spread variations are comparatively
stable over time, implying that it might be suitable to analyze CDS spreads in using change
variables to avoid the problem of non-stationary in the time series.
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Table A.1: Contemporaneous CDS Systematic Factors (Level)
This table reports the regression results for contemporaneous systematic factors for
the 259 U.S. firms over the sample period from January 2001 to June 2018. We
perform time-series regressions for each firm, and report the average coefficients, the
percentage of statistical significance at 5%, and the average adjusted R2 for the 259
regressions. The left panel reports the univariate regressions and the right panel
reports the univariate regressions. Newey-West t-statistics with 12-month lags is
used for testing coefficient significance.
Dependent Variable: Spr (i,t)
Multivariate Regression Univariate Regression
Coef %(p ≤ 0.05) Coef %(p ≤ 0.05) Adj. R2
DftSpr (t) -3.966 (45.56%) 51.218 (74.13%) 0.22
TrmSpr (t) 2.329 (40.54%) 18.949 (63.71%) 0.21
VIX (t) -0.002 (28.96%) 0.029 (72.20%) 0.23
SP500 (t) 0.011 (51.35%) -0.351 (45.17%) 0.19
TB5Y (t) -3.773 (59.07%) -21.324 (67.95%) 0.31
AvgSpr (t) 0.153 (48.26%) 0.785 (76.83%) 0.37
AvgSpr R (t) 0.458 (69.88%) 0.801 (89.96%) 0.50
AvgSpr S (t) 0.440 (55.98%) 0.751 (80.31%) 0.41
Const -0.438 (49.42%)
Adj. R2 0.82
#Obs 41044
#Firm 259
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Table A.2: Lagged CDS Systematic Factors (Level)
This table reports the regression results for systematic factors lagged by one month
for the 259 U.S. firms over the sample period from January 2001 to June 2018. We
perform time-series regressions for each firm, and report the average coefficients,
the percentage of statistical significance at 5% (in parentheses), and the average
adjusted R2 for the 259 regressions. The left panel reports the univariate regressions
and the right panel reports the univariate regressions. Newey-West t-statistics with
12-month lags is used for testing coefficient significance.
Dependent Variable: Spr (i,t)
Multivariate Regression Univariate Regression
Coef %(p ≤ 0.05) Coef %(p ≤ 0.05) Adj. R2
DftSpr (t-1) -3.028 (40.93%) 50.190 (72.59%) 0.21
TrmSpr (t-1) 4.788 (43.63%) 18.934 (62.55%) 0.21
VIX (t-1) 0.004 (33.20%) 0.030 (73.75%) 0.24
SP500 (t-1) 0.163 (53.28%) -0.329 (45.56%) 0.18
TB5Y (t-1) -3.321 (50.97%) -20.335 (66.41%) 0.29
AvgSpr (t-1) 0.111 (41.31%) 0.772 (77.61%) 0.36
AvgSpr R (t-1) 0.399 (64.09%) 0.768 (88.42%) 0.46
AvgSpr S (t-1) 0.397 (54.44%) 0.731 (79.54%) 0.39
Const -2.228 (51.74%)
Adj. R2 0.78
#Obs 40689
#Firm 259
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Table A.3: Sub-sample CDS Systematic Factors (Level)
This table reports the regression results for contemporaneous systematic factors for the 259 U.S. firms by sectors, ratings, and
periods. We perform multivariate time-series regressions for each firm, and report the average coefficients, the percentage of
statistical significance at 5% (in parentheses), and the average adjusted R2 for the 259 regressions. Newey-West t-statistics with
12-month lags is used to test coefficient significance.
Dependent Variable: Spr (i,t)
Sector Rating Period
Materials ConGoods ConServicesEnergy Healthcare Industrials Tech Telecom Utilities AA A BBB BB B CCC PreCrisis InCrisis PostCrisis
DftSpr (t) 9.058 -0.408 -5.624 8.453 -16.917 -4.687 -11.984 4.986 -12.239 -7.949 -4.668 -1.093 -0.290 -11.617 -17.372 11.514 0.515 -8.400
?%(p ≤ 0.05) (40.91%) (53.33%) (41.18%) (57.14%) (38.10%) (49.02%) (26.09%) (27.27%) (54.84%) (44.12%) (35.82%) (44.83%) (54.79%) (52.63%) (37.50%) (39.41%) (49.32%) (42.21%)
TrmSpr (t) 3.877 1.562 1.229 -0.675 4.222 2.289 3.824 2.106 3.340 -0.419 4.657 0.911 3.156 -1.684 6.771 1.432 2.233 -0.340
(36.36%) (40.00%) (38.24%) (33.33%) (38.10%) (33.33%) (39.13%) (72.73%) (54.84%) (29.41%) (44.78%) (43.10%) (41.10%) (31.58%) (50.00%) (45.32%) (50.68%) (39.75%)
VIX (t) -0.003 -0.005 0.004 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.005 0.000 -0.001 -0.003 0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.004 -0.007 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001
(18.18%) (37.78%) (23.53%) (33.33%) (19.05%) (27.45%) (21.74%) (36.36%) (38.71%) (47.06%) (23.88%) (25.86%) (27.40%) (21.05%) (50.00%) (43.84%) (58.90%) (31.97%)
SP500 (t) 0.216 0.152 0.005 0.135 -0.016 -0.174 0.071 0.035 -0.148 -0.140 0.149 0.145 -0.195 -0.058 0.559 0.147 0.355 -0.135
(50.00%) (51.11%) (52.94%) (57.14%) (28.57%) (54.90%) (65.22%) (45.45%) (48.39%) (58.82%) (49.25%) (50.00%) (45.21%) (52.63%) (100.00%) (53.20%) (62.56%) (57.38%)
TB5Y (t) -10.573 -7.387 -2.487 -4.169 -2.575 -0.759 -6.108 -0.030 -0.208 0.246 -2.658 -8.352 -3.423 1.129 -11.830 -0.124 1.455 -3.333
(68.18%) (57.78%) (55.88%) (61.90%) (47.62%) (52.94%) (65.22%) (54.55%) (70.97%) (58.82%) (65.67%) (55.17%) (56.16%) (68.42%) (37.50%) (33.50%) (51.60%) (60.25%)
AvgSpr (t) 0.057 -0.224 -0.009 0.304 0.395 0.337 0.431 -0.317 0.337 0.178 0.124 0.157 0.137 0.329 -0.010 0.297 0.113 0.121
(18.18%) (51.11%) (26.47%) (52.38%) (66.67%) (60.78%) (60.87%) (9.09%) (58.06%) (47.06%) (55.22%) (46.55%) (43.84%) (47.37%) (50.00%) (52.71%) (56.16%) (35.66%)
AvgSpr R (t) 0.472 0.210 0.545 0.661 0.526 0.525 0.563 0.282 0.399 0.479 0.503 0.457 0.424 0.546 0.080 0.534 0.510 0.422
(54.55%) (40.00%) (67.65%) (100.00%) (85.71%) (84.31%) (86.96%) (36.36%) (70.97%) (79.41%) (70.15%) (72.41%) (64.38%) (73.68%) (50.00%) (53.69%) (68.04%) (69.26%)
AvgSpr S (t) 0.305 0.568 0.311 0.358 0.609 0.368 0.466 0.420 0.537 0.391 0.395 0.370 0.452 0.516 1.240 0.383 0.593 0.371
(27.27%) (66.67%) (38.24%) (52.38%) (71.43%) (54.90%) (65.22%) (63.64%) (64.52%) (67.65%) (56.72%) (50.00%) (52.05%) (57.89%) (75.00%) (55.17%) (63.01%) (46.72%)
Const -2.878 -1.279 -0.567 -0.972 0.456 0.638 -0.453 -0.057 0.518 0.156 -1.844 -1.732 1.367 0.606 -0.758 -1.880 -2.380 0.220
(45.45%) (40.00%) (50.00%) (57.14%) (23.81%) (66.67%) (60.87%) (27.27%) (48.39%) (61.76%) (47.76%) (53.45%) (39.73%) (47.37%) (75.00%) (54.68%) (66.67%) (66.80%)
Adj. R2 0.76 0.81 0.78 0.89 0.82 0.83 0.81 0.81 0.85 0.80 0.83 0.79 0.83 0.82 0.87 0.81 0.88 0.79
#Obs 3665 7776 5296 3117 3391 7932 3510 1603 4754 5215 11802 8984 11086 2883 1074 12403 4104 22695
#Firm 22 45 34 21 21 51 23 11 31 34 67 58 73 19 8 203 219 244
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Table A.4: Firm-specific Variable Prediction (Level)
This table reports the panel regression results for firm-specific variables over the
sample period from January 2001 to June 2018. The dependent variable is the un-
explained CDS spread changes by the systematic factors and the independent vari-
ables are the firm-specific characteristics lagged by one period. Left panel reports
the multivariate panel regression and right panel reports the univariate regression.
Firm fixed effect and time fixed effect are controlled in the regression. We use het-
eroskedasticity and autocorrelation (with 12-month lags) robust standard errors to
test coefficient significance. t-statistics is reported in square parentheses. Statistical
significance of 5% is expressed in italic and bold.
Dependent Variable: Idio (i,t)
Multivariate Regression Univariate Regression
Variable Coef t-stats Coef t-stats Adj. R2
Asset(i,t-1) 0.056 [2.94] 0.038 [1.62] 0.05
CASHMTA(i,t-1) 0.059 [3.09] 0.092 [3.95] 0.05
CashRatio(i,t-1) -0.055 [-3.24] -0.011 [-1.12] 0.05
CBCnt(i,t-1) 0.021 [1.17] 0.068 [4.71] 0.05
CBPrice(i,t-1) 0.013 [1.22] 0.075 [3.16] 0.05
CBVol(i,t-1) 0.006 [0.97] 0.039 [3.41] 0.05
CDSAmihud(i,t-1) -0.156 [-7.24] -0.025 [-1.07] 0.05
CDSHL(i,t-1) 0.274 [6.65] 0.232 [6.00] 0.08
CDSSlope(i,t-1) 0.135 [4.28] 0.166 [3.93] 0.06
CDSContr(i,t-1) -0.002 [-0.14] 0.054 [2.28] 0.05
DARatio(i,t-1) 0.005 [0.31] 0.077 [4.63] 0.05
EBIT(i,t-1) 0.011 [0.60] -0.079 [-4.82] 0.05
IntCover(i,t-1) -0.009 [-0.51] -0.081 [-4.90] 0.05
Inv2COGS(i,t-1) 0.022 [2.46] 0.039 [3.89] 0.05
Liab(i,t-1) 0.021 [1.13] 0.075 [3.85] 0.05
LLB(i,t-1) 0.015 [0.44] 0.176 [5.60] 0.07
MBRatio(i,t-1) 0.010 [0.73] -0.082 [-6.03] 0.05
MktCap(i,t-1) -0.096 [-2.19] -0.173 [-8.29] 0.06
NIGrowth(i,t-1) 0.001 [0.17] -0.012 [-1.25] 0.05
NIMTA(i,t-1) -0.029 [-1.48] -0.042 [-3.65] 0.05
RealVol(i,t-1) 0.045 [1.38] 0.067 [3.10] 0.05
ReEarning(i,t-1) 0.038 [3.47] -0.033 [-2.80] 0.05
ROA(i,t-1) 0.007 [0.35] -0.076 [-4.71] 0.05
SaleGrowth(i,t-1) 0.012 [2.04] -0.008 [-1.34] 0.05
StoAmihud(i,t-1) -0.018 [-0.67] 0.088 [3.63] 0.05
StoMom(i,t-1) -0.003 [-0.14] -0.091 [-5.34] 0.05
StoPrice(i,t-1) -0.021 [-1.06] -0.145 [-6.96] 0.06
StoVol(i,t-1) 0.030 [1.34] -0.014 [-0.81] 0.05
WorkingCap(i,t-1) 0.011 [0.98] -0.020 [-2.57] 0.05
Adj. R2 0.13
#Obs 40949
Firm FE Yes
Time FE Yes
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Table A.5: Firm-specific Variable Contemporaneous Panel Regression (Level)
This table reports the panel regression results for firm-specific variables over the
sample period from January 2001 to June 2018. The dependent variable is the
unexplained CDS spread changes by the systematic factors and the independent
variables are the contemporaneous firm-specific characteristics. Firm fixed effect
and time fixed effect are controlled in the regression. We use heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation (with 12-month lags) robust standard errors to test coefficient
significance. t-statistics is reported in square parentheses. Statistical significance of
5% is expressed in italic and bold.
Dependent Variable: Idio (i,t)
Coef t-stats
Asset(i,t) 0.052 [2.87]
CASHMTA(i,t) 0.075 [4.07]
CashRatio(i,t) -0.066 [-3.81]
CBCnt(i,t) 0.007 [0.57]
CBPrice(i,t) 0.021 [1.61]
CBVol(i,t) 0.008 [0.97]
CDSAmihud(i,t) -0.178 [-8.51]
CDSHL(i,t) 0.328 [7.61]
CDSSlope(i,t) 0.169 [5.14]
CDSContr(i,t) 0.017 [0.84]
DARatio(i,t) 0.008 [0.60]
EBIT(i,t) 0.022 [1.11]
IntCover(i,t) -0.011 [-0.66]
Inv2COGS(i,t) 0.020 [2.24]
Liab(i,t) 0.016 [0.85]
LLB(i,t) 0.001 [0.02]
MBRatio(i,t) 0.015 [1.03]
MktCap(i,t) -0.083 [-1.98]
NIGrowth(i,t) -0.001 [-0.19]
NIMTA(i,t) -0.015 [-0.54]
RealVol(i,t) 0.046 [1.44]
ReEarning(i,t) 0.037 [3.57]
ROA(i,t) -0.006 [-0.23]
SaleGrowth(i,t) 0.018 [2.50]
StoAmihud(i,t) -0.006 [-0.25]
StoMom(i,t) -0.002 [-0.09]
StoPrice(i,t) -0.025 [-1.31]
StoVol(i,t) 0.034 [1.49]
WorkingCap(i,t) 0.011 [1.08]
Adj. R2 0.15
#Obs 41044
Firm FE Yes
Time FE Yes
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